An old email about Australia's Foreign Policy White Paper

Back on 17^th September, 2017, shortly after a White Paper on Australia’s Foreign Affairs Policy was announced (see http://dfat.gov.au/whitepaper/index.html), I wrote an email to our Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister, the Hon. Julie Bishop, MP, on what I would like to see included in the final White Paper – I sent the email as I suspected life may prevent me from making a formal submission, and such was the case (submissions closed at the end of February).

I copied the email to quite a few other MPs, so it is not, in my view, a private communication, and thus I have decided to repost it here. I’m tempted to tweak some of it a little now, but have decided I “should” leave it as I emailed it …

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Dear Foreign Minister,

I understand (from media reports – e.g., at http://www.policyforum.net/australian-foreign-policy-white-paper/) that a White Paper will be prepared on Australia’s foreign policies.

Whilst I note some articles questioning this [1] , I consider that this is potentially a good action, depending on the details of how it is put together (and I note that your new Secretary of DFAT looks very capable), and what sort of consultation may be involved (I understand that public consultation is commonly part of the preparation of a White Paper). I have read some interesting articles on foreign policy and “grand strategy” [2] , and there have been quite a few articles on China’s resurgence after it bad couple of centuries, and the possible significance of that for Australia [3] .

On that, whilst I am not an expert, as an Australian citizen I would like to have a say on this area, knowing that this submission will be no more than one small item in a large field where there are many well-established and better informed experts.

Perspective is the issue I wish to begin this submission with.

Throughout human existence, our focus has gradually evolved to broader perspectives – from the family-like tribe of the hunter-gatherers tens of millennia ago, through the city-state focus as agriculture and civilisation developed until the evolution of the modern nation a few centuries ago. Now, with the growth of globalisation in recent decades and humans travelling into space, we have an awareness of humans as a rarity – a triumph of life on a small planet in a very large Universe which should be treasured.

I am of the view that our foreign policy needs to acknowledge, first and foremost, the sanctity – in a nonreligious sense – of life. Accordingly, we should have “not doing harm” as a high principle – much as doctors apparently aim to “first do no harm”.

The next aspect of perspective I wish to touch on is hindsight.

Hindsight is always - unfairly at times - a 20:20 vision exercise, and there is no shortage of such reviews (I have listed some examples in the footnote [4] ). Whilst it is important to learn from such exercises, and to attempt to ensure that properly informed and credible decisions draw on such lessons (the word prescient is perhaps applicable, in some instances [5] ), I consider that it is also important to recognise that there may be times when it is not possible to predict what will happen as a result of an action – no matter how genuinely we attempt to learn and apply knowledge.

Possibly the most convenient example to cite of that is the USA’s involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Although I have read several articles disputing the commonly accepted mythology associated with that period in history [6] , the key thought I wish to convey here is that a decision made with the best intentions can still be found to be wrong later.

There are a number of points that, in my view, flow from the acknowledgement of this possibility.

The most obvious is development and exposition of robustly considered principles, adopted as a guide with a view to try to minimise such later problems: the first of these should be, in my opinion, having the intention to “first do no harm”. This, in my opinion, is important as a guiding principle for civilised life generally, as well as for foreign policy.

I would suggest the following as implementations of this principle:

·         be extremely wary of arms sales.
Personally, I tend towards a preference that Australia never sell any weapons or munitions to other nations, to the extent of ensuring that such cost recoupment is never included in initial budgets, but that is neither realistic, nor fair on, for instance, smaller nations who have received our former Attack class patrol boats.
I am, however, very aware of the enormous damage that has been done by small arms and munitions (for instance, Human Rights Watch has a report on cluster munitions in conflict zones and where they have come from at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/01/cluster-munitions-fewer-stockpiles-new-use, which also reports on progress in destruction of stockpiles; also, I consider the damage that Da’esh has done could have been reduced had their access to munitions not happened [along with a range of other matters such as cutting off their sales of oil]), and I do consider that Australia, as a responsible member-nation of the world, should be extremely wary of being involved in such sales (there will be exceptions, such as supplies to allies such as Iraq) and active in trying to manage or suppress unscrupulous or dangerous forms of such trade [7] .

·         Whilst we probably do need allies (that is a point I would like to see the experts’ opinions on included in the White Paper), and need to be engaged with such allies to the extent that is necessary to be reasonably confident that they will actually support us in our time of need, following said allies into war needs to be carefully considered first:

o   Our involvement with the First World War was largely automatic, and, in many ways, not to our benefit;   our involvement in the Second World War was more clearly warranted – both for our defence, and as an act against great evil;   our involvement with the wars in Vietnam and Iraq was, in my opinion, questionable;   our involvement in Afghanistan, on the other hand, was, in my opinion, justified, but has been tainted by our involvement in Iraq.

o   Canada did not participate in the Iraq War, and, as far as I am aware, did not suffer greatly in consequence [8] ;   on the other hand, New Zealand’s decision of principle regarding nuclear armed vessels led to a loss of access to intelligence and “being on the outer” for quite a few years, but, more recently, success [9] ;

o   If we are supporting something as an interim step (e.g., supporting an authoritarian or repressive state for sake of regional stability – as is possibly the case with Saudi Arabia {I don’t want to go back to Cold War era examples]), I consider that we should elucidate clearly what we are doing, why we are doing it, and what – if any – timeline we would expect the supported state to make changes for the better in - and I acknowledge that such change may take decades. Admitting that, or awareness of the flaws in a situation, may be politically undesirable, but that is a matter which translates to better communication of the need for stability, challenges facing the implementation of change, etc, and acceptance of the need for public debate on important issues – such as declarations of war [10] .

In making this suggestion, I also wish to acknowledge the complexity of many situations ,which is well expounded on in Ross Burns’ article “Looking for an end-game in Syria” [11] . (It is also appropriate to consider the very difficult problem of asymmetric warfare, and the challenges of balancing proportionate response, justice and the healing of victims or relatives of victims of events such as violent extremism.)

I would now like to go back to the issue of principles more generally, and would like to propose the following principles be considered for adoption, in addition to the principle of “first do no harm”, with appropriate statements of commitment, for guidance in our deliberations on foreign policy:

·         democracy (particularly as an expression and facilitator of freedom);

·         equity, human rights and human dignity;

·         human dignity; and

·         empathy.

I personally define “human dignity” as:

“the inherently cumulative holistic combination of human rights, wellbeing and potential, and all actions or interaction which promote, realise or facilitate same. The converse also applies: whatever degrades, diminishes or robs humans of dignity, is inherently undignified”.

On the point of empathy, I suggest that consideration be given to reading the article by Matt Waldman in 2014 “New America Foundation: Strategic Empathy” (linked to on the Council of Foreign Relations website at URL http://www.cfr.org/politics-and-strategy/new-america-foundation-strategic-empathy/p32799).

It is important, however, that the reasons for our adoption of these principles be clear. In my case, the reasons I am suggesting these are that these principles are the best means of ensuring:

·         human rights, as expressed generally in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, more specifically in the ”twin Covenants” (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), and various subsequent adaptations, for all;

·         the proverbial Australian “fair go” (i.e., equal opportunity for all);

·         efficient and effective access to resources for the betterment of all; and

·         that we all maintain our personal human decency – our “humanity” (when human beings object to helping our humans who are in trouble, the greatest diminishing of human condition is in those who did the objecting), as well as maintaining the national equivalent sense of being a “decent” nation.

Further to this, I also propose that our measure of commitment to this be what we are prepared to go without in order to see these happen.

It seems to me that the issue that is probably raised most by activists as a measure of this is that of access to oil (i.e., are we prepared to forgo access or low cost access to oil for the sake of demonstrating a commitment to the principles I have suggested), on the grounds of the quest for oil having led to (in part) past colonialism and its legacy, wars, suppression of human rights in West Asia (aka “the Middle East”), etc, but I do acknowledge that there are other issues to balance here - such as the suffering that would be caused by larger unemployment in the event that our currently oil-dependent economies lost that access, the alliance implications associated with supporting our biggest (but not necessarily best) ally, the USA, and so on … although I do wish to point out that I have yet to come across such counterbalancing issues being presented in public debate, or presented credibly in public debate (which would require acknowledgment of the issues raised by activists as well).

I question, however, whether economic issues are the only measure of such a commitment. In any case, the impacts of any such commitment need to be considered all round. As examples:

·         the campaign to isolate the apartheid regime in South Africa is generally accepted as having contributed to change, and thus the long term betterment of all South Africans overall (there could, perhaps, have been more support of capability building subsequently – which would have come if we adopted a principle of empathy for such decision making);

·         campaigns to isolate the USSR and Cuba did not work, and, in fact, it was the promotion of contact with China (at the expense of Taiwan [12] ) that has opened the door to some change there [13] ; and

·         there is ongoing, intense debate over actions such as attending conferences in Palestine/Israel, and whether that benefits/harms one side or the other.

On a personal note, I have worked on Australian aid projects in China and Viêt Nám (water and wastewater treatment plants), and am pleased those have helped the population of those places, at least in the short term (by improving physical health), but there are also longer term, broader issues to consider, such as whether such actions encourage repressive regimes, or contribute to the many problems associated with population growth.

It can be difficult to make decisions in such complex situations, and those who do so – or attempt to do so – have my respect and admiration.

In undertaking those deliberations, anything which continues the historical trend towards a broader, more realistic (as it could be termed, since it acknowledges the interconnection of life on this world) perspective could be considered beneficial and appropriate (perhaps even “great”, in the sense of “punching above our weight” – which is an attitude that could be questioned, but may have value in promoting acceptance of foreign aid [14] ), whereas anything which tends towards the older, more narrow focused view is, in my view, small minded – not maliciously, perhaps, quite probably as a result of lack of thought or fear of the immediate impacts (such as reduced funding for Australians), but still undesirable.

The ultimate expression of this trend, in my view and, perhaps, that of many religions and economists, is empathy, which helps us to:

·         unlock access to the best resources for doing; and

·         ensure outcomes are directed to those with the greatest need.

To illustrate how this could be applied to foreign policy, I would like to consider China and the USA.

Firstly:

·         the Chinese people have significant needs, and the Chinese government has made outstanding progress in providing for those needs (e.g., lifting people out of extreme poverty), but the Chinese government:

o   has not met all the needs of its people;

o   has imposed conditions and methods which breach human rights; and

o   tends to ignore the valid needs of others in the region, as exemplified by tensions over the South and East China Seas.

·         the USA is a powerful nation, with the world’s leading economy, but:

o   it does not cater for need of all its people;

o   has problems with human rights; and

o   has a history of mixed results from its overseas actions, ranging from outstanding, in the case of the Marshall Plan, for instance, to highly questionable, in the case of its war against Spain in the late 1890s, as an older and thus, perhaps, less contentious example.

If we consider these two nations from the point of view of giving aid, I am of the view that it is useful to “state the obvious”, and therefore consider why we should give aid to China, but not to the USA:

·         the USA has, overall, considerable economic wealth, and the capability (including through genuinely democratic votes) for that to be distributed to people in need (that it doesn’t is a poor reflection on that nation’s lack of empathy as a nation, I would contend);

·         China, although overcoming, in recent decades, a good deal of its problems with poverty and growing its economy, still struggles to meet the needs of its people for a range of reasons, including corruption, a poor governance system, and limited capability in some key areas (I have worked on some aid and other projects aimed at addressing this issue).

The topic of aid to China raises a few issues:

·         where the capability of a government to effectively deliver aid is flawed, it is possible that actions should possibly include one or more of the following:

o   improving that capability of governance as an early activity;

o   ensuring corruption is properly identified, acknowledged and addressed;

o   the use of non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and

o   providing aid that has conditions - the unfashionable “aid with strings”, which can be seen as, and sometimes is, patronising and offensive, but may be required, no matter how great a nation considers itself. Having a clearly established (stated), existing commitment to empathy helps reduce the potential for this to be viewed as such.

·         China is perhaps an exception to the norm that giving aid reduces the possibility of instability or other problems migrating to neighbouring nations.

That last point can also be rephrased slightly: poorly conceived intervention can cause problems which haunt us later – West Asia is probably the most cited example of that.

I also note, however, that it is possible for such intervention to work – for instance, the British intervention in Sierra Leone in the early 2000s, which a complex mix of actions, most of which are ignored by the media for a sensationalist focus on military events. The key is to learn what works, and what doesn’t and in what situations (e.g., knowing what situations match particular actions, much as – and I apologise for a terrible example - doctors will vary medicine to suit the needs of individual patients), and then apply that knowledge.

I wish to cover a few other issues arising from this line of thought:

·         I make a differentiation between the people of a nation and their government. The current events in Syria and, two decades ago, in the former Yugoslavia, which led to the expression of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) principle, have made it clear that governments do not always hold the interests of their people with the reverence and solemnity that they should;

·         China and the USA both consider themselves great nations: they, at times, tend to make the mistake of conflating size and greatness (particularly China, I suggest). I would suggest that greatness is better measured by characteristics that perhaps used to be considered “noble” – characteristics such as freedom and democracy [15] , human rights and dignity, effective education, quality of life (including accessible health care – which could be considered to exclude the USA), and, perhaps, a deliberate move towards the broader world view of the future.
I would judge the latter by signs such as the presence of empathy towards all – albeit with a pragmatic [16] basis (I am aware, for instance, of the challenges for good governance of large populations, as faced by India and China);

·         there can be concerns around misapplication / misuse / abuse of empathy.

The latter problem can be considered a variation of the potential problems associated with “tough love”. There are situations where one has to be “cruel to be kind”, but this can be a problem where that “toughness of love” is based on faulty evidence, and thus is either unjustified, ineffective, or actually harmful.

As an example of that, there is a balancing act between withholding aid to put pressure on a government, and allowing the aid to proceed for the sake of people in a nation.

The sanctions which helped end apartheid are an example of good application of the principle of “tough love”; many of the decisions to withhold aid made during the Cold War are, I would suggest, probably not.

It is also probably worth noting that there will be considerable resistance to the notion of empathy. My view is that such resistance is countered by, in addition to already advanced arguments based on the benefits of promoting human rights and the sharing of stability:

·         acknowledging that nations can, as with individuals, be in a situation of “unearned advantage”. I dislike the term “privilege” (perhaps more accurately termed “social privilege”), as that (a) generally comes across as aggressive, and (b) can hide any awareness that the person with the unearned advantage may not be feeling privileged (e.g., rich people also experience stress, depression, unhappiness, etc). In the case of nations, those that gained from the industrial revolution compared to nations which are trying to develop now, as we deal with negative effects of that revolution, is probably the example I’ve come across most frequently, but there are others – for instance, the benefits that England received hundreds of years ago by taking silver from a Spanish ship, which was taking the silver from South America;

·         the greatest benefit of being (or trying to be) empathic is to us – it results in us being better human beings wherever we are, and, in Australia, it allows us to manifest our proudly held beliefs in a “fair go”, and being a hospitable people.

Senator Robert Kennedy’s comments in response to the assassination of Dr Martin Luther King, Jr. are, in my opinion, a similar call to the “better angels of our nature”:

"What we need in the United States is not division; what we need in the United States is not hatred; what we need in the United States is not violence or lawlessness, but love and wisdom, and compassion toward one another, and a feeling of justice towards those who still suffer within our country, whether they be white or whether they be black."

Whatever decisions are made, for whatever reasons (whether empathy or “tough love” or normal foreign policy principles), I consider it vital to have a well-communicated (much better communicated than the ABS did with their proposed changes to the Census) explanation of the decision making and reasons involved.

One of the reasons for the unpopularity of globalisation is that so many people do not see any benefits for themselves and their families as a result of that, and, in fact, consider they are experiencing problems as a result. Without entering into a debate on that topic in this submission, it does, in my opinion, show that there has been a failure to communicate the benefits and mechanisms by which they would be realised (time frames etc) by those who have advocated for globalisation.

If actions supporting globalisation, such as trade agreements, are ultimately in our best interests, we need a series of explanations of that which are accessible to the complex mix of people that make up our nation.

Perhaps a better (or less contentious) example of this need is justifying why foreign aid budgets are anything other than the often recommended figure of 0.7% of GDP.

Finally, in this era of computing, the Internet, and the drive for “smarter” everything, ranging from phones through the so-called “Internet of Things” to the jobs and economy, I would also like to suggest a stated commitment to learning and improving our foreign policy – not only learning from the past or mistakes [17] , but learning from other current events [18] and successes as well – which is a principle well stated in a review of the film “Sully” [19] - and adapting to the future as best can be done.

As examples of the latter, one of the best ways Councils in Australia can prepare for the effects of future climate is to ensure maintenance of infrastructure is done properly, which possibly has implications for how financial aid is given, and needs also to be considered when we provide aid for infrastructure projects overseas. Any argument that the need for such projects to be financially sustainable as a result (which I have come across in internationally financed projects) misses the human benefits of possibly contributing to ongoing maintenance, possibly by means of a lump sum initially for draw down only for maintenance purposes, if that ensures the project will proceed effectively. If the project does not proceed, human suffering will result for those people affected now, and Australia’s reputation will be harmed in the future – commitment to the principles of empathy and human dignity, however, would help us avoid that mistake.

With regard to change generally, our challenge is and always will be to ensure change avoids generating a backlash on the one hand, or “throwing the baby out with the bathwater” on the other.

To sum this submission up, I respectfully urge that the following principles be incorporated into our foreign policy:

·         “first do no harm”;

·         nuanced application of knowledge and a commitment to learning and seeking to manage change;

·         well-communicated explanations of decision making and thinking (although this overlaps the issue of “transparency”, I see it as slightly different. It may also require a series of explanations which are accessible to the complex mix of people that make up our nation);

·         commitments to democracy, equity, human rights and human dignity; and

·         for sake of maintaining our humanity, empathy.

Thank you for your time.

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[1] For instance, http://johnmenadue.com/blog/?p=7571 and http://johnmenadue.com/blog/?p=7544

[2] As examples of those:   http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/the-consistent-incoherence-of-grand-strategy/;   http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/csi-pentagon-who-killed-american-strategy/;   http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/blowback-as-national-policy/;   and   http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/what-obama-gets-right-and-wrong-on-grand-strategy/.

[3] Such as:   http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-31/paul-keating-warns-australia-to-prepare-for-the-rise-of-china/7800062;   and   http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37211357.

[4] For instance, http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2016/07/11/chilcot-report-lessons-learned-or-mistakes-to-be-repeated/, http://warontherocks.com/2016/07/chilcot-and-a-very-british-history-of-dubious-military-decisions/ and http://www.cfr.org/world/mead-despite-mistakes-united-states-tides-history-iraq/p7620

[5] For instance, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/guiding-principles-us-post-conflict-policy-iraq-report-independent-working-group/p8644

[6] For instance: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html, and https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/27/10-myths-about-afghanistan

[7] Some links I found useful are https://unchronicle.un.org/article/small-arms-no-single-solution, http://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/primer.html, https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/204/42564.html, and http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/armed-violence/conflict-armed-violence/direct-conflict-deaths.html.

[8] URL https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Canada_and_the_Iraq_War&oldid=734640476

[9] URL http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-13/new-zealand-celebrates-anti-nuclear-victory-over-united-states/7731644

[10] See, for instance, http://johnmenadue.com/blog/?p=7526 and http://warontherocks.com/2016/07/he-who-lets-slip-the-dogs-of-war/.

[11] URL http://johnmenadue.com/blog/?p=7569

[12] I consider the recent moves towards a national Taiwanese identity, perhaps as the survivors of the regime that fled there from mainland China pass on, to be an excellent direction for that nation.

[13] On that principle, I found the following article interesting: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/opinion/web-people-vs-wall-people.html

[14] For instance, see http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/the-weight-of-the-punch-british-ambition-and-power/;

[15] On that, there was an interest map published by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies showing the overlap between autocracy and violent conflict at http://africacenter.org/spotlight/overlapping-effects-autocracy-conflict-africa/.

[16] Although I consider pragmatism important, I have chosen not to advocate for it on the grounds that it receives too much emphasis at present.

[17] As examples of that:

·         http://www.cfr.org/world/repeating-1930s-mistake/p19445;

·         http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/history-as-farce-from-napoleon-to-maliki/ (I actually liked the cited Karl Marx comment that history repeats itself “the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce”, which I haven’t come across before);

·         http://www.cfr.org/world/avoiding-mistakes-disasters-past/p7604 (written after the Indian Ocean tsunami);

·         http://www.cfr.org/syria/obamas-syria-policy-deadly-mistake/p32365 (an article which argues, in 2014, on the dangers of inaction - a topic on which I like John F Kennedy's quote "There are risks and costs to a program of action. But they are far less than the long-range risks and costs of comfortable inaction");   http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/assad-or-we-burn-the-country-misreading-sectarianism-and-the-regime-in-syria/;   http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/want-to-build-a-better-proxy-in-syria-lessons-from-tibet/;

·         http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/history-and-americas-atomic-future-four-questions-on-nuclear-statecraft/;

·         https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/07/21/seeing-the-forest-for-the-trees-the-international-criminal-court-and-the-peace-justice-debate/;   https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/11/05/tired-of-waiting-darfur-victims-withdraw-from-icc-case-against-bashir/;   https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/05/26/why-the-method-matters/.

Some other links in this category are:

·         http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/will-america-make-the-same-mistakes-as-china/;   http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/the-opm-cyber-blunder-is-americas-fault-not-chinas/;   http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/11/12/chinese-cyber-power-not-learning-from-the-united-states-mistakes/;   http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/08/13/Is-China-making-a-big-mistake-about-Japan.aspx;

·         http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2013/10/21/reflections-on-united-states-counter-terrorism-mistakes-in-africa/ (on that continent, I find Africa Center for Strategic Studies a good source of information (http://africacenter.org/);

·         http://warontherocks.com/2015/05/civilian-casualties-drones-airstrikes-and-the-perils-of-policy/;   http://warontherocks.com/2015/05/we-need-an-independent-review-of-drone-strikes/;

·         http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/before-we-head-to-libya-again-learning-the-wrong-lessons-from-a-failed-intervention/;   https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/04/15/lessons-in-failure-libya-five-years-later/;

·         http://www.cfr.org/israel/three-mistakes-united-states-must-not-make-israeli-palestinian-peace-talks/p22885;   http://www.cfr.org/palestine/us-repeating-mideast-mistakes/p12442;   http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2011/12/03/panettas-dangerous-mistake/;

·         http://blogs.cfr.org/cook/2012/12/03/morsis-mistake/ (although I haven't access to the full article [budgetary constraints :) ], I would add to any such analysis that the Muslim Brotherhood could be considered to have made a mistake when they broke the agreement NOT to seek Egypt's Presidency).

[18] As an example of this, this article is about subterranean warfare as an issue to consider in military spheres – which is somewhat ironic, given Australia’s involvement in that in World War One and the Viêt Nám War: http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/preparing-for-warfares-subterranean-future/.

[19] URL https://theconversation.com/why-the-miracle-on-the-hudson-in-the-new-movie-sully-was-no-crash-landing-64748