Sunday, 30 October 2016

The Benefits of Stopping

In 1950, after a disastrous initial couple of months which saw most of South Korea occupied, the US-led counterattack pushed the North Koreans back to the 38th Parallel - the point of division of the Korean Peninsula - in around September-October, 1950. Had the counter attack stopped there and then, it is quite possible (although not assured) that China would not have got overtly involved (it had been involved covertly), and the next 3 years of warfare without result may not have occurred - the death toll would have been in the tens of thousands, rather than around three million. The counter attack didn't stop - for a whole range of reasons, perhaps including over-confidence on a number of fronts and a failure to think the consequences through.

There is a reasonable argument that the seeds of Russia's current aggression are partly founded on the breach of an agreement that NATO would not push east - an agreement which helped lead to the fall of the Communist regime in the late 80s. Again, I suspect the complex of reasons that NATO decided it could move east included over-confidence and under-estimating the Russian response. [Note 1]

On the Russian side of things, placing missiles into Cuba in the early 1960s was an act of over-confidence and under-estimation of the responses, an act which almost brought the world to war. (Listening to the JFK tapes on that time is quite instructive - I'm still working my way through those.)

Saddam Hussein under-estimated Iran's strength after the revolution there, under-estimated the possibility of an international response to his invasion of Kuwait, and under-estimated the US-led response to his attempts to bluff over weapons of mass destruction early this century - with devastating consequences for Iraq and the region (and Hussein personally).

In Syria, in current times, I consider it could be a catastrophic mistake to try to push past the destruction of violent extremists and get into regime change - it would create a very high risk of direct US-Russian conflict, and probably extend this already terrible conflict many more years. The current regime in Syria has, in my opinion, lost legitimacy because of its breach of R2P principles, but the fact is they are in power on the ground in what could, perhaps, be called "rump Syria" - they cannot hold all of Syria, or all the areas that Russia enables them to temporarily take, however, and partition is likely to be the way to a highly unsatisfactory in the long term peace, but a peace and slowing down of the killing nevertheless (sadly, because the nature of the Syrian regime, the killing is unlikely to stop .

Provided such partition includes an allocation for Kurds, it may even start to exert a positive influence - in some ways - on the region, even in Turkey's south east. (I note that the Kurds [and others - e.g., Armenia] were treated poorly after World War One -and that war was in itself an example of everyone under-estimating everyone else, and led to an even worse conflagration just decades later which also led to further consequences.) 

Similarly, Iraq needs to accept that it has lost the north to some form of Kurdistan, whether autonomous or truly independent: if it stops after pushing the violent extremists out (I'm not a primary news or information source, so have no hesitation about not naming such organisations - or minimising any naming I do use), there is a good chance of getting to a stage where the focus can be on rebuilding fairly quickly - albeit a rebuilding that will involve challenging and complex negotiations around any concession to Kurdistan.

So here's hoping that restraint wins out over hubris.

PS I should also have added the hubris shown by the Muslim Brotherhood in breaking a prior agreement to seek Egypt's Presidency in 2011. Had they not done so, it is possible that the second military coup would not have taken place.

PPS Since writing this post, I have now (in November, 2021) come across a book which clearly shows others were well aware of the issues in Korea and the decision - driven by Gallup Poll numbers, Democrat fears of appearing militarily weak, and the blustering pompousness of the Prancing General (MacArthur) - to cross into North Korea after a few weeks. 

From "The Cold War's  Killing  Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace" by Paul Thomas Chamberlin

"But American leaders now faced a critical choice: whether to restore the Thirty-Eighth Parallel as the boundary between North and South Korea and claim a victory for international law, or to press the offensive in a bid to roll back communism in Korea and reunify the peninsula under the leadership of the pro-Western regime in Seoul. Had American political and military leaders chosen the former, Korea would likely be remembered as a triumph for the Western alliance: a moment when the United States used its military power, backed by the legal authority of the United Nations, to halt the advance of communism and restore the ROK. Instead, the Americans chose to turn their gaze to the north." 

and 

"But the real winners were Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee. The conflict had helped to consolidate two brutal dictatorships"

 

[Note1] 
I have some further comments on this.
I haven't come across anything to give a good (credible / authoritative / comprehensive) indication of background thinking regarding possible expansion of NATO when the Wall fell in '89, and in the period leading up to that. However, in 1997, an agreement was reached between NATO and Russia which is referred to as the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act (see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm).
The 1997 agreement:
  • states principles (e.g., reduction of non-nuclear forces) and establishes communication mechanisms;
  • clearly foresaw that NATO could expand, as it refers to not putting nuclear weapons/bunkers on their soil;
  • acknowledged "the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security", which has not been respected by Russia;
There is a viewpoint that the changing security environment justifies military bases in eastern Europe (see http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/04/the-1997-natorussia-founding-act-does-not-prohibit-permanent-nato-bases-in-eastern-europe#, for instance - which includes a list of Russian actions since 1999 that differ from Yeltsin's political direction), but I am of the view that it is membership of NATO which is perceived as the more threatening issue: members of NATO can, irrespective of whether NATO facilities are already on their soil, call on other NATO nations for aid when threatened or attacked.
In terms of actions, such as the Baltic States joining NATO, that was foreseen and accepted under the 1997 agreement, albeit perhaps with a proviso that it should not lead to directly militarily threatening actions - on EITHER side, which Russia has subsequently violated.
However, in considering this issue, the following is possibly more applicable:
Violations or perceived violations of the CFE include (below dot points are largely quotes from the above cited Wikipedia link):
  • a June 1998 Clinton administration report stated that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan were not in compliance with the CFE treaty (see http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_06-07/cfejj98.asp). Violations ranged from holdings of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in excess of CFE ceilings to denial of full access during treaty inspections. The report concluded that the compliance issues were not "militarily significant" and Russia and Ukraine, the former USSR republics with the largest holdings among the Eastern bloc, remained within their treaty limits;
  • in the run-up to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's November 1999 Istanbul summit, NATO members perceived three treaty compliance problems. First of all, the continuing existence of Russian equipment holdings in the "flank" region (i.e. Russia's North Caucasus Military District) were in excess of agreed treaty limits. Secondly, the Russian military presence in Georgia was beyond the level authorised by the Georgian authorities. Thirdly, the Russian military presence in Moldova lacked the explicit consent of the Moldovan authorities. During the summit, 30 OSCE members signed the adapted CFE treaty and Russia assumed an obligation to withdraw from the Republic of Moldova, reduce her equipment levels in Georgia and agree with the Georgian authorities on the modalities and duration of the Russian forces stationed on the territory of Georgia, and reduce their forces in the flanks to the agreed levels of the Adapted CFE Treaty.[14] These agreements became known as the "Istanbul Commitments" and were contained in 14 Annexes to the CFE Final Act and within the 1999 Istanbul Summit Declaration. Subsequently, NATO nations refused to ratify these protocols while Russian troops were only partially withdrawn from Moldova;
  • US missile defence plans in eastern Europe were the starting point for Russia's hardening of attitudes and hard-line actions: "These US plans would not have been possible without the 2002 unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the US as this treaty prevented the establishment of new anti-missile defences sites. See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6720153.stm. As Russia saw it, the CFE treaty could thus become (after the ABM treaty) the second major Cold War treaty that was suspended."
So it seems that the so-called "flank nations", such as Ukraine, have always been a point of contention.
The actual trigger for Russia’s withdrawal was the action by US President Bush to plan an anti-ballistic missile base in eastern Europe against a (perceived?) threat of missiles launched from Iran (see https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=United_States_missile_defense_complex_in_Poland&oldid=730886155). This was subsequently cancelled by US President Obama (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8265190.stm), but Russia nevertheless continued on its path - suggesting that the issue of the missiles were merely a pretext.
My view now, in view of this additional information, is that the issue of NATO expansion is less of an inherent problem than I thought: Russia's lack of respect for the self-determination (a legally binding issue under the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act) of Moldova and Georgia (which is a situation not helped by the behaviour of Georgia against its Russian minority), and also the Baltic States (part of Russia in 1997, but subsequently determined themselves to wish to be independent) has led to a significant portion of the problem. Where NATO came undone, however, was thinking it could install missiles in eastern Europe - the hubris to which I referred to in this post.
The events of 1989 were wonderful for the world, and the causes of peace and the wellbeing (including freedom) of people. It seems, however, that the attempts to realise the benefits of those events have been flawed - ideologically, over economic matters (a problem in the "Western" bloc), and politico-militarily with regard to Russia's so-called "flank nations" (a problem on the Russian side) and NATO's hubris / political clumsiness/ineptness (in not perceiving/dealing with the potential Russian response)  in relation to missiles in eastern Europe. 


Tuesday, 11 October 2016

Civil Society

Cross-posting from a forthcoming post on another of my blogs:

I wish to live in a civil society – as do many people, who do not realise it. I do not want people starving on the street; I want people to be able to earn a decent income for a modest home and to be able to access good health care (unlike in the USA); I want those with power (especially in the media!) to be properly accountable. Where it goes a little further for me is that I expect people who have experienced misfortune – such as slipping in a public place – to not be driven to sleeping on the streets or not having adequate health care. There is a vengefulness in our society at present, a vengefulness I consider connected to the struggle to survive, which shows in resentment at money being spent on what some people are dismissing as carelessness – i.e., “why should I pay? They were careless!” Well, my argument is that payment is necessary so we can all share the benefits of a civil society – there may need to be restrictions imposed, such as forcing people to learn not to make avoidable mistakes, or accepting their personal contribution to events, but I still don’t want them reduced to destitution.


This was inspired by this news article: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-08/law-council-lobbying-governments-to-change-public-liability-laws/7915680

More on civil society at https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Civil_society&oldid=743572700, although that has also some strange - in my view - definitions of the term.

Monday, 10 October 2016

Voting ... and Socrates

Well, I've just voted in our local Council elections: 18 candidates, some open about their political affiliation, some not ... and 18 of them.

I've come to favour optional preferential voting in recent years - partly because I consider people who strongly object to someone should have the right not to give them any portion of their vote (and there are people I feel that strongly about, just as others feel that way about candidates that I like :) ), partly to allow voter choice (I disagree with first-past-the-post voting - I think it is crazy, but those who like it can indulge in it for optional preferential voting): now I think I like it because it might save us from muscle cramps :)

I have always felt that voting should be compulsory (and NOT on work days, as is the case in the USA ... the postal voting system for our local Councils here is quite good), but that people should have the right to choose, if they wish to, to tick "none of the above" (which has, apparently been tried, and found to be problematic) or vote for absolutely everyone.

I'll hopefully get around to making some considered and informed arguments about my thoughts on this one day: in the meantime, at least I've expressed them.


I've also just written to several Commonwealth MPs and my local State MLA about an idea that others have suggested: generating solar power on a large scale in north-west Australia, and selling it to south-east and east Asia. I'm not likely to get a reply, but I've made my snowflake contribution to the slowly growing - I hope! - avalanche.

I may write about compelling candidate Councillors to disclose their political allegiances, but I know that has never got up in the past, and it has been discussed several times.

I am also working on a post for this blog about who can vote - largely from the point of view of age. That will be a little longer, as I want to think the implications through more.

Finally, I have also been doing a little work on the political courses: I've started reading Plato's Apology, about Socrates, and ... what a nasty, hypocritical person Socrates seems to be, so far.

I empathise with people who are receiving a hard time - it's what I've had to live with throughout my life, and I look at people who are laughing at others' misfortunes and thinking they could never be in that situation, and feel like telling them about the saying "there but for the grace of the Goddess go I".

Thus, although the people Socrates is showing up are flawed, I am very much aware that I - and everyone else - are also flawed, and thus, in my opinion, we need to be very careful about taking on a right to judge, condemn or belittle others.

Thursday, 6 October 2016

Introduction and Western vs other thinking

I’ve decided to, in a sense, put myself through the political science related courses that MIT has now made available – free, online. Of course, this won’t be the same as actually doing the courses, with active debates and feedback from lecturers, but I can’t afford the cost of signing up to any course, so this is the next best thing :) – for me, at any rate.
This blog is where I will record my thoughts and attempts at assignments (sadly, not marked by lecturers … and thus possibly less restrained and sober than if they were going to be :) ), as well as some comments from time to time on what is happening in politics now that has gained my attention.
I’ve still to get started properly, but one initial impression I have is that the introduction to political science is exclusively focused on the Western tradition. That is, perhaps, understandable, but I consider there may be some advantages in considering other views – for instance, whereas western thought seems to me to be the individual against society, an inherently combative and sacrificial approach, the (traditional?) Asian approach is more about the individual with society – how to harmonise both for mutual benefit.*
Now, one of the concerns that immediately springs to mind - for me – is that the latter may suppress some rights that have been hard won in the West, such as anti-discrimination laws, but one could also, perhaps, view those laws as removing the block of disharmony that is discrimination to better allow people to be themselves and thus contribute more effectively to overall harmony of society and themselves. To put that another way, when same sex attracted (SSA), bisexual (B) and trans/gender diverse (TGD) people are not fighting against pressure to suppress or change themselves, they can more efficiently find harmony in themselves and with the larger society they exist in, as well as that larger society stopping picking on something which is, in the broader “scheme of things”, minor, and turning it into a suppurating mess that it shouldn’t be.
To choose a mechanical engineering analogy, removing discrimination removes attempts to force a bamboo cog to behave as if it is a metal cog, which thus allows both the cog an the overall machine to function more effectively.
More to come – at odd intervals :)

* PS - western history leads to adversarial approaches, whereas eastern admits the possibility of a win-win solution