The Benefits of Stopping

In 1950, after a disastrous initial couple of months which saw most of South Korea occupied, the US-led counterattack pushed the North Koreans back to the 38th Parallel - the point of division of the Korean Peninsula - in around September-October, 1950. Had the counter attack stopped there and then, it is quite possible (although not assured) that China would not have got overtly involved (it had been involved covertly), and the next 3 years of warfare without result may not have occurred - the death toll would have been in the tens of thousands, rather than around three million. The counter attack didn't stop - for a whole range of reasons, perhaps including over-confidence on a number of fronts and a failure to think the consequences through.

There is a reasonable argument that the seeds of Russia's current aggression are partly founded on the breach of an agreement that NATO would not push east - an agreement which helped lead to the fall of the Communist regime in the late 80s. Again, I suspect the complex of reasons that NATO decided it could move east included over-confidence and under-estimating the Russian response. [Note 1]

On the Russian side of things, placing missiles into Cuba in the early 1960s was an act of over-confidence and under-estimation of the responses, an act which almost brought the world to war. (Listening to the JFK tapes on that time is quite instructive - I'm still working my way through those.)

Saddam Hussein under-estimated Iran's strength after the revolution there, under-estimated the possibility of an international response to his invasion of Kuwait, and under-estimated the US-led response to his attempts to bluff over weapons of mass destruction early this century - with devastating consequences for Iraq and the region (and Hussein personally).

In Syria, in current times, I consider it could be a catastrophic mistake to try to push past the destruction of violent extremists and get into regime change - it would create a very high risk of direct US-Russian conflict, and probably extend this already terrible conflict many more years. The current regime in Syria has, in my opinion, lost legitimacy because of its breach of R2P principles, but the fact is they are in power on the ground in what could, perhaps, be called "rump Syria" - they cannot hold all of Syria, or all the areas that Russia enables them to temporarily take, however, and partition is likely to be the way to a highly unsatisfactory in the long term peace, but a peace and slowing down of the killing nevertheless (sadly, because the nature of the Syrian regime, the killing is unlikely to stop .

Provided such partition includes an allocation for Kurds, it may even start to exert a positive influence - in some ways - on the region, even in Turkey's south east. (I note that the Kurds [and others - e.g., Armenia] were treated poorly after World War One -and that war was in itself an example of everyone under-estimating everyone else, and led to an even worse conflagration just decades later which also led to further consequences.) 

Similarly, Iraq needs to accept that it has lost the north to some form of Kurdistan, whether autonomous or truly independent: if it stops after pushing the violent extremists out (I'm not a primary news or information source, so have no hesitation about not naming such organisations - or minimising any naming I do use), there is a good chance of getting to a stage where the focus can be on rebuilding fairly quickly - albeit a rebuilding that will involve challenging and complex negotiations around any concession to Kurdistan.

So here's hoping that restraint wins out over hubris.

PS I should also have added the hubris shown by the Muslim Brotherhood in breaking a prior agreement to seek Egypt's Presidency in 2011. Had they not done so, it is possible that the second military coup would not have taken place.

PPS Since writing this post, I have now (in November, 2021) come across a book which clearly shows others were well aware of the issues in Korea and the decision - driven by Gallup Poll numbers, Democrat fears of appearing militarily weak, and the blustering pompousness of the Prancing General (MacArthur) - to cross into North Korea after a few weeks. 

From "The Cold War's  Killing  Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace" by Paul Thomas Chamberlin: 

"But American leaders now faced a critical choice: whether to restore the Thirty-Eighth Parallel as the boundary between North and South Korea and claim a victory for international law, or to press the offensive in a bid to roll back communism in Korea and reunify the peninsula under the leadership of the pro-Western regime in Seoul. Had American political and military leaders chosen the former, Korea would likely be remembered as a triumph for the Western alliance: a moment when the United States used its military power, backed by the legal authority of the United Nations, to halt the advance of communism and restore the ROK. Instead, the Americans chose to turn their gaze to the north." 

and 

"But the real winners were Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee. The conflict had helped to consolidate two brutal dictatorships"

 

[Note1] 

I have some further comments on this.

I haven't come across anything to give a good (credible / authoritative / comprehensive) indication of background thinking regarding possible expansion of NATO when the Wall fell in '89, and in the period leading up to that. However, in 1997, an agreement was reached between NATO and Russia which is referred to as the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act (see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm).

The 1997 agreement:

• states principles (e.g., reduction of non-nuclear forces) and establishes communication mechanisms;
• clearly foresaw that NATO could expand, as it refers to not putting nuclear weapons/bunkers on their soil;
• acknowledged "the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security", which has not been respected by Russia;

There is a viewpoint that the changing security environment justifies military bases in eastern Europe (see http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/04/the-1997-natorussia-founding-act-does-not-prohibit-permanent-nato-bases-in-eastern-europe#, for instance - which includes a list of Russian actions since 1999 that differ from Yeltsin's political direction), but I am of the view that it is membership of NATO which is perceived as the more threatening issue: members of NATO can, irrespective of whether NATO facilities are already on their soil, call on other NATO nations for aid when threatened or attacked.

In terms of actions, such as the Baltic States joining NATO, that was foreseen and accepted under the 1997 agreement, albeit perhaps with a proviso that it should not lead to directly militarily threatening actions - on EITHER side, which Russia has subsequently violated.

However, in considering this issue, the following is possibly more applicable:

• the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks (https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Mutual_and_Balanced_Force_Reductions&oldid=582083684), which were replaced by:
• Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) (see http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/04/the-1997-natorussia-founding-act-does-not-prohibit-permanent-nato-bases-in-eastern-europe#), which was changed from bloc-based provisions to nation-based limits in 1999 (see https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Adapted_Conventional_Armed_Forces_in_Europe_Treaty&oldid=742502153), although that was not ratified over the issue of Russian presence in Moldova and Georgia.

Violations or perceived violations of the CFE include (below dot points are largely quotes from the above cited Wikipedia link):

• a June 1998 Clinton administration report stated that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan were not in compliance with the CFE treaty (see http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_06-07/cfejj98.asp). Violations ranged from holdings of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in excess of CFE ceilings to denial of full access during treaty inspections. The report concluded that the compliance issues were not "militarily significant" and Russia and Ukraine, the former USSR republics with the largest holdings among the Eastern bloc, remained within their treaty limits;
• in the run-up to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's November 1999 Istanbul summit, NATO members perceived three treaty compliance problems. First of all, the continuing existence of Russian equipment holdings in the "flank" region (i.e. Russia's North Caucasus Military District) were in excess of agreed treaty limits. Secondly, the Russian military presence in Georgia was beyond the level authorised by the Georgian authorities. Thirdly, the Russian military presence in Moldova lacked the explicit consent of the Moldovan authorities. During the summit, 30 OSCE members signed the adapted CFE treaty and Russia assumed an obligation to withdraw from the Republic of Moldova, reduce her equipment levels in Georgia and agree with the Georgian authorities on the modalities and duration of the Russian forces stationed on the territory of Georgia, and reduce their forces in the flanks to the agreed levels of the Adapted CFE Treaty.[14] These agreements became known as the "Istanbul Commitments" and were contained in 14 Annexes to the CFE Final Act and within the 1999 Istanbul Summit Declaration. Subsequently, NATO nations refused to ratify these protocols while Russian troops were only partially withdrawn from Moldova;
• US missile defence plans in eastern Europe were the starting point for Russia's hardening of attitudes and hard-line actions: "These US plans would not have been possible without the 2002 unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the US as this treaty prevented the establishment of new anti-missile defences sites. See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6720153.stm. As Russia saw it, the CFE treaty could thus become (after the ABM treaty) the second major Cold War treaty that was suspended."

So it seems that the so-called "flank nations", such as Ukraine, have always been a point of contention.

The actual trigger for Russia’s withdrawal was the action by US President Bush to plan an anti-ballistic missile base in eastern Europe against a (perceived?) threat of missiles launched from Iran (see https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=United_States_missile_defense_complex_in_Poland&oldid=730886155). This was subsequently cancelled by US President Obama (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8265190.stm), but Russia nevertheless continued on its path - suggesting that the issue of the missiles were merely a pretext.

My view now, in view of this additional information, is that the issue of NATO expansion is less of an inherent problem than I thought: Russia's lack of respect for the self-determination (a legally binding issue under the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act) of Moldova and Georgia (which is a situation not helped by the behaviour of Georgia against its Russian minority), and also the Baltic States (part of Russia in 1997, but subsequently determined themselves to wish to be independent) has led to a significant portion of the problem. Where NATO came undone, however, was thinking it could install missiles in eastern Europe - the hubris to which I referred to in this post.

The events of 1989 were wonderful for the world, and the causes of peace and the wellbeing (including freedom) of people. It seems, however, that the attempts to realise the benefits of those events have been flawed - ideologically, over economic matters (a problem in the "Western" bloc), and politico-militarily with regard to Russia's so-called "flank nations" (a problem on the Russian side) and NATO's hubris / political clumsiness/ineptness (in not perceiving/dealing with the potential Russian response)  in relation to missiles in eastern Europe.