When is it better to defer/delay or avoid wars?

The most obvious answer to this question is probably “always”, as it will avoid the injury, death, trauma and devastation of violent conflict. However, subject to any change of views from my imminent reading of Michael Howard’s “War and the Liberal Conscience” (pub. Rutgers University Press, 2004, 1^st pub. 1978, ISBN 978-0-8135-1197-9; available on Amazon), there are some situations where war is the lesser of two evils – for instance, in self-defence, or against evil – such as World War Part Two (WWpt2)against the Nazis (the war against Japan was largely, in my view, a defensive war, but there were some elements of empires not wanting other empires that were shared between the lead up to that war and the build up from 1871 to WWpt1 and WWpt2).

Of course, such wars should be fought ethically, and with minimisation or – if possible – prevention of civilian casualties and damage. To quite an extent, that has improved since WWpt2. As an example, consider:

• the D-Day landings to start the liberation of France incurred, in one day, over 4,400 Allied military deaths, several thousand German military deaths, and at least 3,000 French civilian deaths (I have read figures of 15,000 French civilian casualties during the preparatory bombardment [e.g., see here – which also gives graphic descriptions of the brutality, so be careful about looking at it], but that may also include injured: these figures are what I have got from Wikipedia today. See here on the difficulty of coming up with accurate numbers of casualties);. This is 3-15,000 civilian deaths per day, and a ratio of 0.2 to 1.9 civilian deaths per military death;
• the morally indefensible invasion of Iraq incurred around 200 Allied deaths, anywhere from 7,000 – 45,000 Iraqi military deaths and 7,269 civilian deaths over a six week period. Of course, deaths since then have been appalling, and that is a key part of the tragedy, but to consider the initial invasion, civilian deaths were 173 per day (as an average), and the ratio of civilian to military deaths was 0.003 to 0.024, or at most 10% of the ratio of civilian to military deaths from D-Day, and possibly as low as 1.3% of the earlier ratio.

The big difference is that, these days, civilian casualties are far better covered by the media. If we had had the same coverage of civilian – and military – deaths in WWpt2 … well, the outcry might have made the UN a far more effective body or had some other good impact (maybe better support for the civilian victims of that war?).

The problem I can see with deferring war – and I acknowledge that this is an outcome the current flawed state of our violent human societies – is when it constitutes appeasement, which was most famously a prelude to WWpt2. The consensus is that appeasement is a bad thing: most views consider appeasement either facilitated Hitler’s consolidation of power and martial ambitions, or allowed those to develop by not sending a disapproving signal.

The only support I have found for appeasement is from John F Kennedy, who argued in his thesis that starting WWpt2 earlier could have been disastrous militarily for the UK, as it hadn’t rearmed enough.

Since WWpt2, the United Nations has been a significant moderating influence of many political situations, and negotiation options have become more viable alternatives to the appease vs. war axis.

Nevertheless, appeasement remains something of concern, and most nations today are generally concerned about anything that makes them look weak. In the film “The Sum of All Fears”, there is a scene where the fictional Russian President says it is better to appear wrong than to appear weak.

On the other hand, consider what would have happened had the US-led forces stopped at the North-South Korean border in late 1950 (I first discussed this possibility here) – and, as you read this, keep in mind that the initial division of Korea is largely a measure of where the armies stopped at the of WWpt2:

as I suggested in my earlier post, if the US-led forces had stopped at around the border in late 1950, an initial outcome would possibly have been a death toll would have been in the tens of thousands rather than three million, and the possible avoidance of China becoming overtly involved. Longer term outcomes might have been:

• North Korea’s leader may have found it harder to build up and capitalise on the us vs. them mentality that has contributed to the North Korean (DPRK) regime being so seriously unstable;
• to express that differently, the passion on both sides that has made the Korean Peninsula such a tinderbox over the years would have found it harder to become established (consider this from the point of view of the Cure Violence methodologies).

The risk is that the DPRK would have tried again if the US-led forces had stopped, but I doubt they would have had the capability to do so without China’s overt involvement, and stopping at the border would have removed China’s reason for becoming overtly involved.

It is possible that the DPRK would have been tempted to invade South Korea again in the mid- to late-60s, when the USA was mired in the Viêt Nám war, but, at that time, China:

• had border tensions (including a “border incursion” aka war) with India;
• was in the process of a very acrimonious split with the USSR (including a border conflict); and
• became absorbed in its crippling “Cultural Revolution” – which I suspect was just as damaging to China’s military as Stalin’s purges in the 1930s had been to the USSR military;

so any Chinese backing would – if it occurred – likely been substantially smaller.

On the other side, it is unlikely that the USA would have allowed its forces in South Korea to be weakened as they had been in the late 1940s, and it would possibly have had access to more resources as a result of the final end of the occupation of Japan, and the conscription that was supporting the US military’s involvement in Viêt Nám.

Ultimately, the devastation of the famine in the DPRK during the 1990s, which was to a significant degree an outcome of the dissolution of the USSR, would possibly have crippled the DPRK beyond consideration of another invasion. It is tempting to think that the famine might have led to the fall of the DPRK regime, but, by that stage it was being led by a 2^nd generation despot, who had expanded the cult of personality and had the enhanced skill at despotry (e.g., the divide-and-rule principle used to devastating effect by the Ancient Romans, and further refined by the British [and other European] Empires) that such an upbringing would give, and thus any attempted rebellion may well have failed.

On that, consider the tight grip on power that 1^st generation despots such as Saddam  Hussein, Idi  Amin or Robert Mugabe have, and the even more calamitous grip being shown by the 2^nd generation (see here, here, and here) Assad regime … then consider the probable grip on power of the 3^rd generation despot currently in power in the DPRK …

Now, consider the following potential conflicts:

• the USA vs. the DPRK; and
• the USA vs. Russia.

The main mediating influence on the DPRK is China, which has made statements (via its press) that indicate a significant reduction in the DPRK’s significance to China. China is still a totalitarian state, but it has growing middle class, and that is likely to be, in the long term, a moderating influence on China. Deferring a war with the DPRK would, apart from preventing insane casualties, damage and the risk of a widened regional conflict verging on yet another world war, give China’s middle class a chance to grow and further moderate China’s totalitarianism (which is unlikely to be a smooth, easy or casualty free process), and eventually to rein in the DPRK.

In terms of Russia vs. the USA, although Ukraine and the Caucasus are currently active conflict zones, it is more likely that conflict between these two would occur at a significant level in Eastern Europe, with a smaller possibility of a conflict originating in Syria. If a conflict is deferred, it gives the chance of either or both current leaders being replaced, and, more importantly, it gives the current crop of young opposition figures a chance to develop and apply their skills – which, again, would be neither easy nor casualty free.

About the only place in the world I could see a conflict having any likelihood of anything close to a positive outcome would be in Zimbabwe, and (a) I don’t see anyone else interested, and (b) give Mugabe’s age, it would be extremely hard to justify a violent war against a well-entrenched despot, with all the social division that would lead to.

I may insufficient information, but, pending any further information, my conclusion is that there is no just reason for precipitating conflict anywhere in the world at the moment.

The foresight - and flaws - of past visionaries

In 1940, HG Wells - yes, the famous science fiction author - published a small book titled "The Rights of Man" (my copy Penguin, 2015, ISBN 978-0-241-97676-0); sexist title, notwithstanding the disclaimer Wells included, but a major step towards our modern understanding of human rights, and written with a view to stimulating discussion. I'd known about Wells' prediction of scientific advances, but was less familiar - until recently - of his foresight in other matters.

According to the Wikipedia link I gave above, Wells:

• had stated that his epitaph should be: "I told you so. You damned fools"; 
• predicted - in 1933 - that World War Part Two would begin in January, 1940.

Impressive - sadly so, but impressive.

Also included in the Wikipedia article was an explanation of the widening gap that social class would become - which was a key theme in "The Time Machine". As I look now at the growing problems of inequity that Thomas Piketty and others have so eloquently written about, and the possible future problems with employment owing to automation etc (which will simply continue to concentrate power in the hands of the already elite), I consider that Well's prediction was even more prescient than he thought.

I can see the same enhanced prescience in other writings, and in particular, part of his preamble to the revised declaration of rights contained in "The Rights of Man". Read this ...

It becomes imperative to adjust [people’s] life and institutions to these increasingly dangerous conditions. [They] being forced, almost in spite of [themselves], to collectivise what was once a patchwork of separate sovereign states and at the same time to rescue [their] economic life from devastation by the immensely enhanced growth of profit-seeking business and finance. [They are] doing this clumsily and blindly, and with a great sacrifice of happiness, and well-being. Governments become either openly collectivist under stress of necessity, or they become the instruments of monopolising financial and business organisations; their power and aggressions increase, they concentrate controls, they subordinate the functions of religious organisations, education and the press to their domination; the direction of scientific and literary work and a multitude of social activities never concede hitherto to the state, fall into their hands; they are not organised for such purposes; abuses and tyrannies increase, and liberty, and particularly liberty of thought and speech, decays. Throughout the whole world we see variations of this same subordination of the individual to the organisation of power. Phase by phase these ill-adapted governments are becoming uncontrolled absolutisms; they are killing that free play of the individual mind which Is the preservative of human efficiency and happiness. The populations under their sway, after a phase of servile discipline, are plainly doomed to relapse into disorder and violence. Everywhere war and monstrous economic exploitation break out, so that those very same increments of power and opportunity which have brought mankind within sight of an age of limitless plenty, it may be lost forever, in an ultimate social collapse.

 ... and consider the "subordination of the individual to the organisation of power" which has occurred in response to violent extremism.

At least, however, we have not reached the same state of violence as happened in , and we have people, organisations and a few nations who are working for the maintenance of freedom - guided, in part, by the vision of HG Wells, and others like him.

Here's to continuing and implementing that vision.

Postscript - I have re-read Wells' book using an e-book version, and I now consider his sexism - which is aggressively paternalistic in one place - to be too much to overlook. The general concepts and wording are worth using as quotes from time to time, but whenever I do so now, I will correct the sexism - and with no loss to the quality of writing to modern sensibilities that are free of sexism, just as writing that is free of racist pejoratives also has no loss of quality.
I've also noted others sources that have been prescient, and the blatant errors in Wells' expectations of the future (such as us all living under "collectivism by around 1960), and thus are less enamoured of Wells' predictions.

Reasons to enter public service - aka, become a politician

Recently I was talking with a friend (who is also a relative), and happened to mention that I was considering standing for election. That led to further discussion, including the issue of why one could validly stand for election, with my friend stating that one should only stand for election for love of one's nation, and not for the pay packet (which is, to the possible surprise of some politicians, seen as quite considerable by many voters - with some reason, given that it is well above the typical pay).

I would phrase that sentiment slightly differently, in that I would ideally also exclude a desire for power (which I will come back to), but I thought I also have problems saying that I love my nation, and I have been thinking about that since then.

My initial reaction was along the lines of I want to be able to love my nation, but I cannot, given our growing inequity (which is contrary to the view I was surrounded with when growing up [in a white, middle class culture], that Australia is an egalitarian nation [I am - now - very aware of the irony in that]), and our hypocrisy over hospitality.

The latter point is over the issue of how we treat refugees, but first: the claimed tradition of hospitality. I recall reading a view that the tradition of hospitality is possibly due to such traditions amongst Irish convicts. That may be, although it could also be due to the demands of survival in what seemed, to the British and Irish in the late 1700s and early 1800s, a hostile and harsh land (I suspect such traditions have evolved in other such situations), or some other influences. (I am not in a position to talk about such traditions / practices amongst the indigenous peoples of Australia, but that is worth researching, for anyone who hasn't considered it.) 

The tradition could also be, in part at least, simply wishful thinking - much as the view of Australians as rugged, self-reliant bushies that I also grew up with was not correct then, and probably hasn't been correct since some point in the early 1900s or late 180s (we are now a very urbanised nation).

What is not wishful thinking is that we are NOT being hospitable, or even reasonable in my view, when it comes to refugees. That is a complex issue, including, for instance:

• our breaking of our word, which has been given on international treaties, for - in my view - political expediency (i.e., so the Howard government could get re-elected) and in response to a fear that is lacking in validity (perceptions about refugees are, in my experience and based on what I have read, wildly inaccurate); 
• concerns about security of borders (which is not enhanced by behaving in a panicked, fearful manner).

In the context of this discussion, our behaviour towards refugees is - and this is a pathetically weak description - not in any way, shape or form, "hospitable".

In fact, our treatment of refugees is so appalling that, in my view, we cannot claim to be hospitable - any small examples of hospitality that we exhibit in our everyday lives is as meaningless as the appalling practice of buying forgiveness (the commercialisation of "indulgences") from the Middle Ages that was one of Martin Luther's reasons for beginning the Protestant Reformation.

Refugees are refugees out of desperate necessity, including a fear for the ones that they love (family and friends; you might choose to fight oppression in an invasion or civil war, but you would surely want your children in a place of safety): responding with fear and harshness to their great need is not offset by offering a few alcoholic beverages occasionally to one's friends.

Actually, that last point also raises the fact that there are a few problems with the Australian "tradition" of hospitality (and perhaps other versions of it):

• alcohol has too prominent a part in modern versions of hospitality (a few centuries ago, alcohol was a safer way of drinking than what was often available as drinking water, but that hasn't been the case for a long time now - also, the bushie tradition was to boil the billy and have a cuppa, not to get drunk to the point of physical incapacity, which would be dangerous in such situations. These days, alcohol too often leads to violence); 
• my experience is that "hospitality" is too often used as an excuse to control others' behaviour - e.g., the accusations of being a "party pooper" if one doesn't agree to get disgustingly drunk, perhaps if one wishes to be hospitable by offering a traditional cuppa rather than alcohol; 
• those seeking hospitality too often forget that there are obligations of respect from the guest towards the host (this is an aspect that seems to be better addressed in Confucian traditions - and is also very strongly observed by refugees who are accepted into this nation); and
• apart from all that, there are valid buy varying views on what constitutes "hospitality" - which is simply part of the complex mix that is any society, whether it claims to be multicultural or monocultural.

The above is largely a consideration of the issue of hospitality from the personal and small group scale: that is also a useful scale to consider the topic of love from.

If one considers love of one's family, for instance, a lot of family members have differing values (which is one of the reasons that many family Christmas celebrations can be so unpleasant), but there is an expectation that one will love one's family members, despite clashes in values. In most circumstances, that is reasonable, but there are situations where it is NOT warranted - for instance, in the case of an abusive family member.

Religious values may become relevant here, with the sentiment of "love the person but hate the sin". There is a place for that, but I consider that the first and most primary need is making sure that the victim of the abuse - especially if that victim is a child - is safe.

To extrapolate from that to the situation of being (or wanting to be) a politician:

• the safety of nations is also important, but that safety has been weakened by how we treat refugees, not increased (keep in mind (1) that there has always been screening of refugees, and (2) the proportion of refugees who commit violent attacks is, according to an article I read a little while ago, much lower than the rest of the population); 
• one could say that one loves the nation but hates it sins - one wants one's nation to be free of inequity and fear, and to be confident enough to TRULY be hospitable (if nothing else, we could actually treat refugees humanely while their claims are being assessed).

Wanting to make one's nation "better" is a valid reason for wanting to be a politician - there may be disagreement about the nature of "better", but that is part and parcel of politics. As an example, I disagree with what neoliberals seek, but I concede that their desire for the nation to be better is valid. This also, to some extent, constitutes a desire for power - the power to influence the direction one's nation is taking, which I consider justifiable, or potentially justifiable, unlike the desire for power in order to be a powerful person.

I'm not so sure about any expression of a desire for Australia to be great, or "great again" as Trump trumpeted during his election campaign last year in the USA - Australia is a mid-level nation in terms of international influence, and wanting that to simply be bigger strikes me as a very playground approach to the topic of "greatness".

Nevertheless, I do want Australia to be a nation that I can feel proud of - in the sense of loving despite its faults, yes, I love Australia ... but we have a fair few problems to address.

Contributing to fixing those problems is why I am considering seeking election. I love Australia, and want to be able to be validly proud of Australia again.