When is it better to defer/delay or avoid wars?

The most obvious answer to this question is probably “always”, as it will avoid the injury, death, trauma and devastation of violent conflict. However, subject to any change of views from my imminent reading of Michael Howard’s “War and the Liberal Conscience” (pub. Rutgers University Press, 2004, 1^st pub. 1978, ISBN 978-0-8135-1197-9; available on Amazon), there are some situations where war is the lesser of two evils – for instance, in self-defence, or against evil – such as World War Part Two (WWpt2)against the Nazis (the war against Japan was largely, in my view, a defensive war, but there were some elements of empires not wanting other empires that were shared between the lead up to that war and the build up from 1871 to WWpt1 and WWpt2).

Of course, such wars should be fought ethically, and with minimisation or – if possible – prevention of civilian casualties and damage. To quite an extent, that has improved since WWpt2. As an example, consider:

• the D-Day landings to start the liberation of France incurred, in one day, over 4,400 Allied military deaths, several thousand German military deaths, and at least 3,000 French civilian deaths (I have read figures of 15,000 French civilian casualties during the preparatory bombardment [e.g., see here – which also gives graphic descriptions of the brutality, so be careful about looking at it], but that may also include injured: these figures are what I have got from Wikipedia today. See here on the difficulty of coming up with accurate numbers of casualties);. This is 3-15,000 civilian deaths per day, and a ratio of 0.2 to 1.9 civilian deaths per military death;
• the morally indefensible invasion of Iraq incurred around 200 Allied deaths, anywhere from 7,000 – 45,000 Iraqi military deaths and 7,269 civilian deaths over a six week period. Of course, deaths since then have been appalling, and that is a key part of the tragedy, but to consider the initial invasion, civilian deaths were 173 per day (as an average), and the ratio of civilian to military deaths was 0.003 to 0.024, or at most 10% of the ratio of civilian to military deaths from D-Day, and possibly as low as 1.3% of the earlier ratio.

The big difference is that, these days, civilian casualties are far better covered by the media. If we had had the same coverage of civilian – and military – deaths in WWpt2 … well, the outcry might have made the UN a far more effective body or had some other good impact (maybe better support for the civilian victims of that war?).

The problem I can see with deferring war – and I acknowledge that this is an outcome the current flawed state of our violent human societies – is when it constitutes appeasement, which was most famously a prelude to WWpt2. The consensus is that appeasement is a bad thing: most views consider appeasement either facilitated Hitler’s consolidation of power and martial ambitions, or allowed those to develop by not sending a disapproving signal.

The only support I have found for appeasement is from John F Kennedy, who argued in his thesis that starting WWpt2 earlier could have been disastrous militarily for the UK, as it hadn’t rearmed enough.

Since WWpt2, the United Nations has been a significant moderating influence of many political situations, and negotiation options have become more viable alternatives to the appease vs. war axis.

Nevertheless, appeasement remains something of concern, and most nations today are generally concerned about anything that makes them look weak. In the film “The Sum of All Fears”, there is a scene where the fictional Russian President says it is better to appear wrong than to appear weak.

On the other hand, consider what would have happened had the US-led forces stopped at the North-South Korean border in late 1950 (I first discussed this possibility here) – and, as you read this, keep in mind that the initial division of Korea is largely a measure of where the armies stopped at the of WWpt2:

as I suggested in my earlier post, if the US-led forces had stopped at around the border in late 1950, an initial outcome would possibly have been a death toll would have been in the tens of thousands rather than three million, and the possible avoidance of China becoming overtly involved. Longer term outcomes might have been:

• North Korea’s leader may have found it harder to build up and capitalise on the us vs. them mentality that has contributed to the North Korean (DPRK) regime being so seriously unstable;
• to express that differently, the passion on both sides that has made the Korean Peninsula such a tinderbox over the years would have found it harder to become established (consider this from the point of view of the Cure Violence methodologies).

The risk is that the DPRK would have tried again if the US-led forces had stopped, but I doubt they would have had the capability to do so without China’s overt involvement, and stopping at the border would have removed China’s reason for becoming overtly involved.

It is possible that the DPRK would have been tempted to invade South Korea again in the mid- to late-60s, when the USA was mired in the Viêt Nám war, but, at that time, China:

• had border tensions (including a “border incursion” aka war) with India;
• was in the process of a very acrimonious split with the USSR (including a border conflict); and
• became absorbed in its crippling “Cultural Revolution” – which I suspect was just as damaging to China’s military as Stalin’s purges in the 1930s had been to the USSR military;

so any Chinese backing would – if it occurred – likely been substantially smaller.

On the other side, it is unlikely that the USA would have allowed its forces in South Korea to be weakened as they had been in the late 1940s, and it would possibly have had access to more resources as a result of the final end of the occupation of Japan, and the conscription that was supporting the US military’s involvement in Viêt Nám.

Ultimately, the devastation of the famine in the DPRK during the 1990s, which was to a significant degree an outcome of the dissolution of the USSR, would possibly have crippled the DPRK beyond consideration of another invasion. It is tempting to think that the famine might have led to the fall of the DPRK regime, but, by that stage it was being led by a 2^nd generation despot, who had expanded the cult of personality and had the enhanced skill at despotry (e.g., the divide-and-rule principle used to devastating effect by the Ancient Romans, and further refined by the British [and other European] Empires) that such an upbringing would give, and thus any attempted rebellion may well have failed.

On that, consider the tight grip on power that 1^st generation despots such as Saddam  Hussein, Idi  Amin or Robert Mugabe have, and the even more calamitous grip being shown by the 2^nd generation (see here, here, and here) Assad regime … then consider the probable grip on power of the 3^rd generation despot currently in power in the DPRK …

Now, consider the following potential conflicts:

• the USA vs. the DPRK; and
• the USA vs. Russia.

The main mediating influence on the DPRK is China, which has made statements (via its press) that indicate a significant reduction in the DPRK’s significance to China. China is still a totalitarian state, but it has growing middle class, and that is likely to be, in the long term, a moderating influence on China. Deferring a war with the DPRK would, apart from preventing insane casualties, damage and the risk of a widened regional conflict verging on yet another world war, give China’s middle class a chance to grow and further moderate China’s totalitarianism (which is unlikely to be a smooth, easy or casualty free process), and eventually to rein in the DPRK.

In terms of Russia vs. the USA, although Ukraine and the Caucasus are currently active conflict zones, it is more likely that conflict between these two would occur at a significant level in Eastern Europe, with a smaller possibility of a conflict originating in Syria. If a conflict is deferred, it gives the chance of either or both current leaders being replaced, and, more importantly, it gives the current crop of young opposition figures a chance to develop and apply their skills – which, again, would be neither easy nor casualty free.

About the only place in the world I could see a conflict having any likelihood of anything close to a positive outcome would be in Zimbabwe, and (a) I don’t see anyone else interested, and (b) give Mugabe’s age, it would be extremely hard to justify a violent war against a well-entrenched despot, with all the social division that would lead to.

I may insufficient information, but, pending any further information, my conclusion is that there is no just reason for precipitating conflict anywhere in the world at the moment.