More on the struggle to survive

I recently cross posted an article on the struggle to survive. I want to add to that, but I'm going to repeat the opening of that post to set some broader context:

"I dislike writing about the struggle to survive in the West because of the desperate problems in developing nations, but the existence of worse problems elsewhere does not mean there are no problems here (and the cretins who think distraction with worse problems elsewhere is a valid coping technique, as opposed to solving the problem, are directly and personally responsible for their share of the perpetuation of those problems). I've been moved to write this brief post because I have now come across two more people who are either reducing hours or on leave to deal with the problems caused by modern life pressures."

I've mentioned elsewhere that I have had to cut some of my blogging back for the sake of my health, and most of that is work related. I've now found out a little more about the workload problems in the company I work for:

• we have just over 1,000 people in Australia: we also have job ads out at the moment for around 120 positions; 
• of my immediate team of 8 people, 4 of whom were hired in the last year because I was jumping up and down about the need for more people, we are advertising for a much needed senior position - and four of those people are showing varying degrees of signs of stress; 
• I had a three and a half week break over the end of 2017/start of 2018 period, of which two weeks was time off in lieu (I need the time back: money doesn't make up for loss of health), but said I still wanted to take a couple of weeks off in February (the end of year break, whilst the longest I had had in around twenty years, was just getting me back to a normal state after a year of work - I still needed a normal holiday ... and I've yet to get that (not as a result of pressure from the company - I'm trying to keep clients happy, and, after decades of experience, I know what is involved in achieving that);
• we heard of another resignation related to workload, and I'm aware from talking to friends and other senior colleagues that we need more people than have been advertised for; 
• and the message from management is ... most of our financial indicators are good, but one or two still need to improve.

That last point is not particularly unusual in engineering companies - and is certainly not unique to where I work now. In fact, I've been fighting the utilisation rate battle, as I term it, for four decades now, and we're about where I expect to be in this, the fourth such cycle that I've been through.

In fact, this is one of the reasons that I consider (most) engineers should not be elected as politicians: most of us have a focus on numbers, and either forget to consider what that means for people, or are incapable of doing so (engineering has been plagued by jokes about "being on the spectrum" for decades, but I think it is more than that: there is also a desire to be service to the community which leads to a willingness to do unpaid overtime - but can be warped into thinking one has to make sacrifices "for the company", as if that is the same thing as benefit for the community [there are linkages, but they are separate matters - there is also the question about how much profit companies - including in places like the USA - would be making if all that overtime was actually properly aid]).

The company I work for is by no means unique in this current workload situation. I am fairly regularly contacted by head hunters, and the last one made a comment that I could be placed in another job within a couple of days if I was prepared to move outside my area of speciality (I've declined, on professional grounds - although this also possibly highlights the problem that women are more cautious in that we make sure we can do a job before taking it on).

However, why would I go from a frying pan to another frying pan, if not the fire?

Workload and work stress are OHS liabilities, and companies need to move away from the dollar-focused, neoliberal approach, to thinking about what issues mean in terms of human impact. In my case, I am not doing what I want to in the garden or around the house, nor working on the things I enjoy (work stopped being enjoyable because of the workload a long time ago), and my health and wellbeing has been seriously harmed. I know we had a suicide a few years ago, and I know that there has been speculation that it was work related.

How many resignations, how much suffering, how many suicides, does it take before society starts to look at what it is doing to people through neoliberal-induced financial and time (everything has to be fast-tracked) pressure? 

(That comment particularly applies to consumers and customers more generally who are seeking less expensive goods or services. The worst expression of that demand is modern slavery, but there are other consequences as well.)

There is a joke that you can have it fast, accurate, or cheap: pick any two. (Based on past cycles, it will be concern over "quality problems" [i.e., errors] that drives a re-thinking of the focus on financial only indicators.) That still applies, but needs to be extended somehow to include poor health and suffering as consequences - how much do you want to be responsible for?

A journalism exercise: Better local government governance

(One of my many studies at the moment is journalism. I may from time to time publish my fledgling efforts in that field here ... sorry) 

Local government will be held to higher standards of governance under new laws announced by Victoria’s State Government.

The Minister for Local Government, Marlene  Kairouz, introduced the Local Government Bill 2018 into Parliament on Tuesday.

The bill, which has been developed after three years of community consultations, repeals and replaces the Local Government Act 1989, and will:

• define sexual harassment and provide the power to remove those who commit harassment;
• provide the Minister the power to suspend individual councillors who pose a significant threat to the governance of a council for up to a year, rather than having to sack the entire Council, and Councils means to remove mayors;
• impose requirements for four year budgets, higher standards in strategic planning and financial management, and require that service charges levied by Councils do not exceed the cost of those services.

The Minister said “We are bringing this Act into the 21^st century – helping make councils more accountable and focused on the needs of their communities. … We want councils focused on the long-term and these changes will help them do exactly that.”

The Andrews Labor state Government has previously implemented rate-capping and the Know Your Council website to improve accountability of local Government.

Previous dismissals of Councils have included the Central Goldfields Shire Council in 2017,and the Greater Geelong City Council in 2016 by the Andrews Government, and the sacking of all Councils, 210 at the time, by Liberal Premier Jeff Kennett in 1994. When the Andrews Government revised the Code of Conduct in 2016, 13 Councils and over 100 councillors came close to being dismissed for failing to sign by the deadline. Special legislation extended the timeline.

In February, the then Lord Mayor of Melbourne resigned over sexual harassment allegations that he “vigorously denied”.

According to the “Know Your Council” website, Victoria's local government sector has 79 Councils, employs over 50,000 people (out of a work force of around 3 million [estimated from here and here]), spends more than $7 billion (in an economy with a Gross State Product of $426 billion) on service delivery and $2 billion on infrastructure annually, and manages over $70 billion in public assets.
The conservative state opposition has been unhappy with some decisions by local Councils, such as changing, after consultations with ratepayers, how Australia Day is observed in response to Indigenous concerns. At that time, the opposition leader called on the State Government to consider "sacking this rabble".

The work of the sector, which is established under the Constitution Act 1975 and the Local Government Act 1989, has expanded as the needs of communities extend and interdependence with other levels of government continues to grow. Currently, services include public health, traffic, parking, and animal management, and maintenance of roads, bridges, drains, town halls, libraries, recreation facilities, parks and gardens.

In Victoria, this work is overseen by the Minister for Local Government. Accountability of elected Councillors and administration, both of whom are subject to Codes of Conduct, includes auditing, financial requirements, and monitoring of performance. Expectations include:

• acting with integrity, honesty and respect;
• exercise responsibilities impartially in the interests of the local community;
• avoiding conflicts of interest;
• exercising reasonable care and diligence;
• endeavour to ensure that public resources are used prudently and in the public interest
• act lawfully; and, for Councillors,
•  lead by example and act in a way that secures public confidence in the office of Councillor.

The third tier of Australia's Government, the Commonwealth, is not directly involved in the regulation or administration of local government. It does, however, support local government through a number of programs, including the provision of funding through financial assistance grants, and encourages innovation in local government through the National Awards for Local Government. 

More on this here and here.  

Worldwide Governance Indicators and Tanzania

Tanzania

Introduction

I recently came across a site providing measurement (from the 1990s) of various indicators of the quality of governance of nations. The project – an offshoot of the World Bank – is fascinating, and I’ve decided to see what I can do with it.

The easy and obvious approach would probably be to look at the data and, in effect, use it to confirm what is already well known (i.e., certain nations have more stability than others). However, that is not adding anything new.

What I have decided to do is to go through the data and see if I can use that to determine what nations are at risk of a deterioration which possibly could be arrested or minimised.

There are a few nations I have some concerns over – for instance, Bangladesh, which has been placed under enormous strain by the influx of Rohingya fleeing the genocide in burma. The most recent data, however, are from 2016, so that won’t show up. Two nations which are also on my mind are Uganda, which is experiencing pressure from refugees and neochristian zealots, and Tanzania, which had a very promising President elected recently, but seems to be experiencing some backsliding.

For this first self-set assignment, I’ll work on Tanzania, which – to an outsider like myself – has no obvious reason for problems, whereas Uganda is still in the three generation transition from the despot Amin to democracy (which Tanzania was the only nation brave/ethical/motivated enough to cause, through its military action to remove the tyrant who, in eight years of human rights abuses and incompetence had managed to kill possibly as many as half a million people).

Tanzania - The Governance Data

Using data from 2006 and 2010 to 2016 (inclusive), and comparing Tanzania’s data to the aggregated data for “sub-Saharan Africa”, the following is indicated:

Voice and Accountability

(capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media)

Tanzania is consistently above the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, but with a peak percentile (aka “comparative rating”) of 44^th in 2011 and slow decline since then to a 38^th percentile in 2015 and 40^th percentile in 2016.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence

(capturing perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism)

This set of data is less clearly favouring Tanzania. Over the period 2010 to 2012, Tanzania’s percentile is consistent, and above the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, but outside that, it is more variable. In 2016, Tanzania had a 30^th percentile, compared to 32^nd for sub-Saharan Africa.
It should also be noted that sub-Saharan Africa declined from 36^th to 23^rd over this period.

Government Effectiveness

(capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies)
The last four criteria are of particular interest to me.

On governmental effectiveness, while the mas aggregate of sub-Saharan African nations has been fairly stable on this aspect (percentile 27^th or 26^th), Tanzania declined from 40^th in 2006 to 26^th in 2014, after which it recovered to 34^th. I would expect a new, good President to be able to help cause something like this, but then we get to regulatory quality.

Regulatory Quality

(capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development)

Tanzania has been consistently above the rest of sub-Saharan Africa on this (although still in the lower half of the worldwide range), but with a decline from 2014 to 2016 of 41^st to 36^th, over which period sub-Saharan Africa declined from 30^th to 28^th.

Rule of Law

(capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence)

This aspect also shows a decline over the period 2006 to 2011, then a rise until 2015, declining to 38^th percentile (still above the relatively constant 30^th to 31^st percentiles for sub-Saharan Africa, and below the world median).

Control of Corruption

(capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests)

I will shortly be seeing what the advocacy groups have to say, if anything, about this. As far as the data from this site goes, there was a marked decline from 49^th percentile in 2006 to 23^rd in 2013 (below the 30^th to 32^nd range for sub-Saharan Africa over 2006 -2016), after which there was a steady recovery to 35^th in 2016.

So . . . what happened? Why have these patterns been apparent?

I’ll look at some other information before I try to make sense of all this, but I also want to note that having a high or low percentile is a relative matter: it doesn’t mean, in an absolute sense, that something is either adequate or inadequate – that requires a whole other set of detailed investigations and analyses that I’m not in a position to do.

Tanzania - Other Information

My sources for additional information are:

• the CIA (yes, that CIA) “World Factbook” on Tanzania;
• the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies;
• the International Crisis Group;
• Freedom  House’s “Freedom in the World” – see historical listing here;
• several Wikipedia pages: overview of nation, the current President, the Uganda-Tanzania war which removed the tyrant Idi Amin, the founding President Nyerere, (lack of) LGBT rights, persecution of people with albinism, and human rights in Tanzania;
• news outlets:     the BBC overview and news articles,     Reuters news articles,     The Guardian news articles;
• the Federation of American Scientists’ (a surprising but useful reference) 2011 overview and 2017 assessment of current issues and US policy.

Key relevant information from these additional sources is summarised as follows (and would be better summarised had I more time – ah, roll on retirement :) ):

• Tanzania is largely stable, with a reasonably good history on ethics (including interventions in neighbours, and a position of “elder statesperson” for many of its key former figures) - see here, here, here, here, here, and here;
  (These are all secondary sources, as I don’t have the time [or money] to personally track down primary sources, but I am comfortable with this statement owing to range of sources stating this)
• although stable, Tanzania has a number of political issues, including:   a delayed transition to a weakly pluralistic democracy (see here, here, and here) with questions over aspects of the electoral process (particularly on Zanzibar – see here),   continuing restraint of political opposition (see, for instance, here, here, here, here, here),   suppression of media (see, for instance, here, here, here and here),   and corruption (see, for instance, here, here [which quadrupled revenue], and here) which, combined with poor service delivery, has “hampered efforts to curb widespread poverty and reduce widespread reliance on subsistence agriculture” (see here, ).
  The FAS 2011 overview included the following:
  “Although the Tanzanian government is not reported to be responsible for any politically motivated killings or disappearances in the past year, there have been several instances of unlawful killings by policemen and prison guards. Police and prison wardens are also accused of torturing and threatening suspected criminals. The police force lacks funding and is plagued by corruption and the excessive use of force. According to the State Department 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:
  Principal human rights problems in both Tanzania and Zanzibar included the following: use of excessive force by military personnel, police, and prison guards, as well as societal violence, which resulted in deaths and injuries; abuses by Sungusungo traditional citizens’ anticrime units; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; lengthy pre-trial detention; judicial corruption and inefficiency, particularly in the lower courts; restrictions on freedoms of press and assembly; restrictions on the movement of refugees; official corruption and impunity; societal violence against women and persons with albinism; child abuse, including female genital mutilation (FGM); and discrimination based on sexual orientation. Trafficking in persons and child labour remained problems.”
  The 2017 FAS assessment also included a comment about “impunity in police and security forces, who sometimes act outside of civilian control” [emphasis added].
• the current President has a reputation for honesty, but is behaving in an authoritarian manner (he makes decisions without consultation, is notably authoritarian on freedom of expression [Tanzania has “grown rapidly following the advent of the multi-party era in the mid-1990s”, but “threats and attacks against journalists hinder critical reporting, according to US-based Freedom House”, and laws push media to self-censor – see here], has question why judges have been cleared of corruption [which could be corruption, or that they were innocent], and foreign workers have had their passports seized – see here) - what I would term the “Big Man” problem (although “strongman” seems to be the more applicable term used by others), which goes back to the personality cult which built up around the nation’s first President, someone who was not good for the economy initially, but whose ethics unified an ethnically and religiously diverse population (see here and here). Politically, Tanzania is ranked as “partly free”, which shows progress since the 70s and 80s;
• the current President was elected on a platform of addressing corruption. Although he has taken some action, as stated above, corruption remains a problem, and Transparency  International’s Corruption Perception Index for 2017 fives Tanzania a score of 36 out of 100, and a ranking of 103^rd out of 180;
• further to the political and human rights problems listed above, Tanzania has a number of other serious human rights problems, but the nation has, unlike some other African nations, committed to staying in the International Criminal Court (ICC):
  “Many of the countries that have spoken against withdrawal see the Court as an extension of their commitment to greater accountability for gross violations of human rights and international crimes”;
• other human rights problems in Tanzania include:   gender-based discrimination, which Tanzania was encouraged to continue its efforts at “discouraging traditions affecting gender equality” (see also here, here, here),   horrendous persecution of people with albinism (see also here),  discrimination against minorities (see here, for instance),   rampant homophobia and transphobia (see also here, ),   and a range of other issues – see here;
  The 2011 UN Human Rights Council’s periodic review on Tanzania made 96 recommendations which were supported by Tanzania, 53 recommendations which were to be examined by Tanzania by 2012, and 4 recommendations (on sexual orientation and “practices and stereotypes that discriminate [against] women) that were rejected. Tanzania can only be considered as homophobic, and probably also transphobic – and LGBT discrimination is a bellwether for discrimination generally which, combined with the appalling abuses of people with albinism, indicates a culture that is broadly stuck in superstition. Apart from the inherent problems of that alone, it shows a society that is vulnerable to the Big Man delusion;
• hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled to Tanzania (see here) from Burundi as a result of the crisis in the latter, and is causing problems in the former, as evidenced by this nonsensical call for Burundian refugees to return home;
• some violent extremism, including returning extremists, threats to tourism (also under threat by the impact of poachers), unrest in Zanzibar (see here, here,
• ongoing poverty (25^th poorest nation by GDP – see here, here, and here) and economic problems (see here, ), including a resource mining dispute (more resources [gas reserves] have been discovered). This is possibly not helped by having a population with a very high proportion of very young people (see here). Urbanisation is still low (around one third), but increasing, and there is a net emigration, suggesting dissatisfaction with life in Tanzania (see here);
• other issues including transhipment of drugs, and a range of health problems including HIV/AIDS, limited numbers of doctors, malnourishment, limited sanitation and unsafe drinking water (see here), indoor pollution from cooking fires (being addressed by electrification - see here and here), lack of pain relief (e.g., see here), tuberculosis (with a novel detection method – see here), mosquito borne disease.

Although they miss the crucial human rights issues, I will end this section with the following (slightly edited) summary from the 2017 FAS document and a key passage from an article on democratic transitions by the African Centre for Strategic Studies:

“Tanzania is likely to remain a generally stable but poor developing country for the foreseeable future. Increasing multiparty competition may contribute to gradual growth in demand for political change, democratic accountability, improved governance, and greater political pluralism—but potentially also to increased political tension. Growing access to information, notably via mobile phones, may spur similar trends by increasing exposure to information on current events, and global social and governance norms. . . . (Thomson Reuters Foundation/Kizito Makoye, “Mobile phones a boon for Tanzanian women in business, banking: researchers,” 5^th October, 2015, and “Tanzania rolls out birth registrations by mobile phone,” 13^th October, 2015) Such changes, along with continuing infusions of foreign assistance . . . and gradually improving public infrastructure and government services, are likely to spur increasing economic activity, production, and trade, thus improving quality of life for the Tanzanian people.”

and

“in Tanzania, it is still at times difficult to distinguish between the party, government, and military. However, commitment to separating them exists, and citizens are increasingly confident that the army is insulated against factional fights in CCM. Ghana, the foremost icon of African struggle politics, is now an emerging democracy after a tumultuous experience with military and autocratic rule. Like Somaliland, power there alternates between ruling and opposition parties. Tanzania, another African icon of liberation, albeit through a non-violent liberation movement like Ghana’s, thrives on a culture of peaceful power transfers and competition. Unlike Ghana, power remains within CCM. However, the Tanzanian political process—problems notwithstanding—allows space for opposition to challenge CCM policies.”

Tanzania – Conclusions

My conclusions – and these may be wrong - are:

• Tanzania has a major problem with corruption. The current President is good on this issue, but he is undoing all his hard work by wanting to be a strongman or possibly even a Big Man;
• The President’s authoritarian problem is symptomatic of, and contributing to that nation’s discomfort with difference – a discomfort which manifests in abuse of power (including political oppression and abuses by police and security forces) and savage, at times superstitious discrimination. All Tanzanians need to be comfortable with difference and disagreement over ideas – to be able to “agree to disagree”, as a way to stamp out discrimination and abuse of power as well as fix governance problems;
• Tanzania needs to learn how to capitalise on its natural resources and feed the income into education, especially of girls;
• Tanzania, a nation which has shown itself to be courageous and big-hearted, is experiencing a major impact from refugees. Addressing that problem requires both short and long term action: short term, in the form of international aid to help with the refugees, and long term in the form of promoting effective, pluralistic democracies throughout Africa, so political crises leading to displacement and refugees no longer occur.

Needless to say, none of the suggested remedies is easy.