North Korea and Hope

This week, there seems to be reasons for - cautious - hope with the move towards a back on again - and no doubt theatrical - summit between the leaders of North Korea and the USA.

When I was younger (last millennia), we lived through other times of hope from various summits and meetings - mostly between the USSR and the USA, but also between Israel and Palestine.

In some cases, there were good reasons for that hope – for instance, the various Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties (SALT) were important - albeit at the time seemingly small - steps towards ending the Cold War.

At times there seemed to be good reason for hope, as when the Oslo Accords led to things like joint Palestinian-Israeli patrols, but that hope was later dashed. In the case of the Oslo Accords, my view is that the progress was sunk by people with what I term a Newtonian worldview (a belief in direct force to achieve personal interest/preference), which led to the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin (yet another crime to join the assassinations of Lincoln [which, in my opinion, resulted in an ongoing divide between North and South and racism in the USA]*, Gandhi, John F Kennedy * , the great Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. *, and Bobby Kennedy), the election of the hardline Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu, and some factions of the PLO leaving for more extremist organisations (the latter may also have included motivations that I would classify as macho reasons – ultranationalism, trying to be physically impressive, etc).

Another setback was the stroke of the transformed (compare this with this) Israeli leader Ariel Sharon.

With regard to North Korea, the clumsy words of the USA’s current National Security Advisor (which the survival-obsessed regime took as an existential threat), combined with North Korea’s political skills (I’ve heard radio discussions on how North Korea has for several decades been playing outside forces against each other: what used to be USSR vs. China is now China vs. USA) and history since the mid-1950s of going to the brink and being as unpredictable as the USA’s 45^th President wishes to be, appeared to have dashed hopes that a summit would occur.

Engaging with North Korea has, in the past, had some success, and there was almost was a previous summit, but, according to Madeline Albright in (Chapter 14 of “Fascism: A Warning” (pub. Harper, 2018, ISBN 978—06-283683-0), President Clinton thought he had more chance of peace in West Asia, between Israel and Palestine, than of a good result with North Korea.

In hindsight, that was a mistake.

The world is living with other mistakes – most notably, in my opinion, ultra-Newtonian worldview-holding, former (43^rd) US President Bush’s combination of (a) including the North Korea with Iraq and Iran in its “axis of evil”, and (b) invading Iraq on a fairly shaky pretext.

There have been other mistakes – probably beginning with the decision to invade North Korea after it had been pushed out of South Korea in 1950, which I have written about before.

I started a review of some key historic events for a previous article on North Korea that I never finished (that is, neither my article nor my review of the history were finished – the main source I was using as a starting point for my review is here), and it may be worth reviewing that partial history here (incidentally, the “Democratic” People's Republic of Korea is North Korea's “official” name - hence the acronym DPRK [South Korea officially is the Republic of Korea, or ROK]) to see the various “might-have-been”s and the politicking on all sides:

• in the decade or so after the Korean War, the DPRK made good economic growth (better than the South) - and started a nuclear programme;
• in 1985, the DPRK signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation  Treaty (NPT), but “does not complete a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)”;
• the DPRK’s growth failed as the personality cult grew, was further harmed by the break up of the USSR in 1989, and eventually ended in a massive and long lasting famine that killed around 5% of its population and saw a wide range of other problems (Chapter 14 of Madeline Albright’s book “Fascism: A Warning”) but also led, eventually, a decision to be self reliant (see also here);
• in 1991, the USA – under former (41^st) US President Bush - announced the withdrawal of all overseas nuclear weapons, liberates Kuwait and temporarily partially invades Iraq, and South Korea promised to not go nuclear – which “if enacted, would satisfy all of North Korea’s conditions for allowing IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities”;
• in 1992 the two Koreas agreed on denuclearisation, and the DPRK reached an agreement with the IAEA, but the USA imposed sanctions over “missile proliferation”;
• in 1993, the IAEA raised concerns over reports by the DPRK and demanded inspections of two facilities, following which the DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT – although inspections were allowed - but undermined - in 1994 to avoid UN sanctions. 1994, during the famine and following an assurance in 1993 by the USA “against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons. Washington also promises not to interfere with North Korea’s internal affairs”, is also when a deal (proliferation-resistant light water reactors and fuel oil for dismantling heavy water reactors) was reached between the USA and the DPRK (leading to discussions on missiles, and a call for full normalisation of political and economic relations), and when the DPRK’s first leader is succeeded by its second (which can potentially throw a spanner into the works of continuity);
• in 1996, after arguing for the easing of sanctions as a precondition, the DPRK meets with the USA on missiles, and demanded compensation for loss of revenue. The USA imposed sanctions on the DPRK and Iran for transferring missile technology to other nations;
• subsequently, the DPRK continued developing and selling missiles (including selling Scud missiles to Iraq), and - with its economy now well and truly “struggling” (to put it nicely) - continued to insist on compensation for suspending its missile programme (the source I am using also includes this: “September 9, 1999: A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate reports that North Korea will “most likely” develop an ICBM capable of delivering a 200-kilogram warhead to the U.S. mainland by 2015” - which was only a couple of years out, and that possibly reflects the effect of sanctions etc). 1998 saw the third round of US-DPRK talks (held in the USA) on missiles, but they made “little progress. The United States [repeated] its request for [the DPRK] to terminate its missile programs in exchange for relief from economic sanctions. North Korea [rejected] the US proposal on the grounds that the lifting of sanctions is implicit in the 1994 Agreed Framework”;
• 1999 saw the bombing of Yugoslavia, but this didn’t seem to affect anything on the Korean Peninsula;
• in 2000 a summit on reunification led to an easing of sanctions. A deal on missiles seemed close (and included a promise by the DPRK to Russia), but the sticking point seemed to be verification (was the deal truly close, or was North Korea just playing for time? See Madeline Albright’s comments above);
• in 2001, after initial indications Bush would continue where Clinton ended, his harder line following the terrible events of “9/11” led to hardline action by the DPRK - so being “the tough guy” lead to things falling over (which was probably good for Bush's polling, but was bad for a "true and lasting" peace). Nevertheless, the DPRK's missile moratorium (which had been agreed to continue until 2003) continued - initially;
• in 2002 the USA started talking publicly of invading Iraq, included the DPRK with Iraq and Iran in its “axis of evil”, the DPRK complained about what it termed the USA’s “high handed and aggressive” approach but said it would extend the moratorium on missile testing in response for normalisation of relations with Japan,  the DPRK’s fuel oil supply was suspended, a call for clarification by IAEA was rejected, some missiles being shipped to other nations were intercepted, and the DPRK restarted its nuclear reactor and kicked IAEA out;
• in 2003, Iraq was invaded and the DPRK resumed testing long range missiles.

Now, 15 years later, we are possibly back where we were in the mid-late 90s – there is a chance of peace, but no-one is really certain just how much North Korea can be trusted.

There is another set of major problems: the political naïveté and inexperience, arrogance and hubris, and ultra-Newtonian worldview of the USA’s “unpredictable” and misogynistic 45^th President, someone who I refer to as Voldemort II.

So what should –or can – we do?

Well, what happens at this summit is largely beyond the reach of voters in democratic nations, let alone those who survive under the repressive North Korean regime. It is worth, though, in the lead up to any future talks, for voters in democracies (all – not only the USA) to contact their elected representatives, and urge them to actively support a mutually respectful and safe agreement between all the key players on the Korean Peninsula – and, in particular, the signing of a peace treaty to end the Korean war, allow normalisation of political relations, and open North Korea to economic investment and aid.

Up to now, North Korea has been forgetting that the respect it craves is a two way street, and its political games have shown a disrespect - and often a contempt - for other nations that undermines its claims to be deserving of respect.

Connected to that, North Korea also needs to remember that other nations are not stupid. North Korea may make outrageous pronouncements in the interests of its internal propaganda and possibly think that will be seen as “saving face” or the political equivalent thereof, but it is actually seen by South Korea, Japan and other nations as deception – i.e., telling lies.

The lies may gain North Korea a little time between concessions, but the price that is paid is huge – and sanctions are just the tip of the iceberg: it is the loss of trust from the trivialisation of international relations that is the main problem.

And trust is going to be key in any peace agreement or treaty.

This has all been written from the point of view of the threat that North Korea poses to international peace. However, its human rights abuses and repression are not, and will not be, forgotten. From the point of view of those outside North Korea, we will no doubt go through a stage where we expect economic growth and exposure to lead to change, as it did to a limited extent in the USSR. However, China’s current repression of its growing middle class constitutes, at the very least, a setback in such expectations in that nation, and possibly signal a need for other (nonviolent) measures for change.

In this week that is also the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, and also remembering the discontent that has happened in China, the partially successful “Arab Spring”, and the near loss of control of North Korea’s armed forces during the famine, the present Kim may need to rethink his addiction to authoritarianism if he wants to maintain some semblance of power: repression can be thrown down from within, as shown in the USSR, the Philippines, and Romania, and as almost shown in Syria – where second generation Dictator Assad needed help from trusted (there’s that word again) friends to stay in power.

If Kim Jong-Un wants to maintain a family-led regime, he may need to consider such history lessons as the transition of England to a constitutional monarchy – or, at the very least, a pseudo-democracy like that in Cambodia under a former member of the notorious  Khmer Rouge, or the 49% democracy (my term) in genocidal and generally violent  burma.

Going back to individuals (in democracies) outside of North Korea, and remembering the successes of Amnesty  International, I wish to emphasise that there is always action that individuals can take – it may seem to be quite small, such as writing or ringing one’s elected representative(s), or expressing a different opinion around the water cooler at work, but every little bit contributes towards a groundswell that can change the world.

It may take time (for instance, the fight against slavery has been underway for thousands of years, but has made good progress in the last few centuries, and is fighting back against a reactionary version [modern slavery] in the last decade or so), but every drop of water that joins in contributes to the ocean. I’d normally continue my writing by focusing on the positive aspects of this, but, in the week of the 50^th anniversary of the murder of Bobby Kennedy, I’m going to look at the negatives:

• Every person who turns the “compassion starts at home” argument into “compassion also stops at home”, or argues for self interest above all else, is actively standing with the assassins of Lincoln, Gandhi, JFK, Dr King and Bobby Kennedy;
• Every person who says the rest of the world is not relevant to them or their nation is actively standing with the murderers of Yitzhak Rabin, denying the transformation of Ariel Sharon, and is actively for the violence in West Asia between Israelis and Palestinians;
• Every person who can’t be bothered to join a possible groundswell by contacting their elected representative about a better world is an active SLAVE of the military-industrial complex, and is actively dishonouring Gandhi’s Satyagraha, the nobility of Nelson Mandela, and the power and potential of People Power, including the ultimately successful anti-apartheid campaigns, the overthrow of the despot Marcos in the Philippines, and the Solidarity-led revolutions that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall (as part of the end of communism in Eastern Europe and the Cold War);
• Every person who won’t think for themselves or won’t stand up in their everyday  life for their human  rights and a more compassionate and inclusive society is a potential SLAVE-COLLABORATOR of dictators like Hitler, Stalin, Hussein and Kim; and
• Every cynic is just pathetic.

Who will YOU stand with?

 * There is no mention of the lasting “cultural and societal” consequences for the USA in these articles, other than the immediate reactions to Dr King’s murder: in my view, the murders of JFK, Dr King and Bobby Kennedy scarred the heart and soul of the USA, leaving an embittered, cynical and uncompassionate wreck of a nation behind.