Book review and lessons from Barbara Tuchman’s “The Guns of August”

A list of my book reviews can be found at https://politicalmusingsofkayleen.blogspot.com/2019/09/studying-book-reviews.html.

I first read this book back in the 1980s, and suspect I read a different edition, as I have a vague recall of a specific list of 15 lessons.

Be that as it may, the details of the version I now have are:

“The Guns of August”, by Barbara  W.  Tuchman, pub. Penguin (2014), first pub. Macmillan (1962), ISBN 978-0-241-96822-2 (Amazon)

This book is probably most famous to me for the claims – which I have come across in several locations, including, most recently, the film “Thirteen Days” - John F Kennedy’s desire that his military personnel involved in the Cuban  missile  crisis had all read the book, on the grounds that they needed to understand the warning not to assume that they understood what their opponents were going to do.

I actually found the BBC series “37 Days” better at conveying that particular issue than this book.

So . . . to the book itself, which is set out in three main sections:

·       the planning (and prelude);

·       the outbreak of war; and

·       the initial few weeks of war, up till the Battle of the Marne.

In this review I will focus on the first section. Much has been written about the actual fighting, and a fair bit about the July crisis, but I found this book most useful in relation to the years prior to war, and I want to precis that.

The book begins with a powerful illustration of the interconnectedness of the elite that ruled over Europe: the number of royal families present at the funeral of one of their own, Edward VII of the United Kingdom (referred to as the King of England in the book), many of whom were related by blood. (The funeral party also included significant dignitaries from the USA and Asia.)

Significantly, Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II boasted of his familial connection – but the Kaiser also relished the demise of the person he blamed for a perceived “encirclement” strategy against Germany – “understandings” with Russia, Japan, and, in response to concerns at Germany’s naval programme (also affected by the cost of building Dreadnoughts, which saw an abandonment of the UK’s “two navy” strategy [1] , France (which had entered an alliance with Russia in 1892).

Amazingly, Ms Tuchman reports that German suspicions prevented a German-English entente in 1899. She also reports that Bismarck, who had been central to the formation of a German Empire, did not want Germany to be anything other than a land-based power, and spends some time outlining the character flaw of envy of the Kaiser, and of Germany more broadly.

France in the 1900s saw Germany as an aggressive threat, and was also interested in cultivating the UK – but more for aid on the land, than at sea (“Clemenceau . . . told Edward that when France needed help, England’s sea power would not be enough, and reminded him that Napoleon was beaten at Waterloo, not Trafalgar”). France played a key role in resolving tensions and mutual contempt to enable the Anglo-Russian Convention.

The Kaiser tried – with some clumsy patronising attempts at guidance - to circumvent the Convention with an agreement for mutual aid which the Tsar signed, but “expired” when his ministers pointed out the conflict with the agreement with France.

Meanwhile, one book “proved” that interconnectedness meant war was so costly to all concerned that no-one would start one. One of the disciples of this view was the Chair of the UK’s commission looking into the military disaster the Second Boer War. A subsequent German book covered such matters as “The Right to Make War”, “The Duty to Make War”, and “World Power or Downfall”, arguing for aggression as “a necessity”, and that one must strike first – whereas the Kaiser wanted to avoid that “odium”.

In the section of this book discussing the plans being prepared by the various nations, Germany’s contempt for other nations is apparent in Schlieffen plan – but England’s interest in Belgium is portrayed as purely a means of forward defence, taking advantage of an opportunity created by a desire for self-determination (as it would later be termed) in 1830, and realised by England working to create a balance of power. Germany, at this time, is still Prussia, and Austria is still a significant presence. In the 1870 war between France and the new Germany, England had played mediator, and emphasised importance of Belgian neutrality, so Germany was aware of the significance of this, and justified their plans as “military necessity”.

The planning by Germany did consider military issues, and some novel solutions were adopted – such as using reserve units in the front line. However, their planning was rigid (ignoring Clausewitz’s warnings to “leave room for the unexpected”), and built on a number of assumptions (and the larger size of armies then as compared to 1870 – which the old Moltke had warned, in 1890, could prolong wars [the younger ignored similar moments of insight]), and those applied to Russia were subsequently shown to be flawed (and thus the first notch of the lesson JFK and so many others have drawn from this tragedy), and the fighting capabilities of the British army and Belgium were also underestimated. The effect of modern weapons was underplayed (although some realised the impact of these – an Austrian developed a proposal for what was later known as the tank in the 1900s [2] ).

Ms Tuchman writes: “One constant among the elements of 1914 – as of any era – was the disposition of everyone on all sides not to prepare for the harder alternative, not to act upon what they suspected to be true.”

The role of German culture is also highlighted, with a widespread, pervasive sense of destiny in the context of becoming powerful attributed to a century of philosophical (Fichte, Hegel, and Nietzsche) and military (von der Goltz) influences. Yet some aspects were ignored – such as, in addition to matters already discussed, Bismarck’s warning “it would be against ‘plain common sense’ to add another enemy to the forces against Germany.” (Bismarck also warned against occupying Alsace and Lorraine.) Germany thought it could bribe Belgium’s King Leopold, who was known to be avaricious: this was not revised when the very different Albert came to the Belgian throne.

France’s planning did not know of the novel aspects of Germany’s planning, and was also blighted by arrogant assumptions.

In my opinion, the events described by this book shows that the desire for respect is as important for nations as people – Germany was young, but wanted to be like the big (empire) kids. All were trampling on rights of their imperial “subjects”, but World War One did even more massive damage to those imperial “subjects”, as to people elsewhere. The desire for respect becomes a problem when that quest becomes “at any cost” (i.e., war), or is infected by paranoia, arrogance, or other personal flaws in key people. German arrogance made the war inevitable; German arrogance made it inevitable that their planning would be flawed.

France’s equivalent and near-equal flaw was the blind belief in spirit – élan, which made, for instance, the rejection of uniforms that didn’t stand out like target bullseyes, attacks wasteful of humanity, and the bloodiness of Verdun inevitable. At least they believed in adaptability, but the half of Foch’s teaching on tactics and other military necessities (also inspired by Clausewitz) got lost, as did a prescient plan to resist an expected attack through Belgium . . . At least one visionary arguing for use of soldiers aged between 25 and 33 and that war would be of mass armies was ignored, as were intelligence warnings.

While nerves were stretched over the possibility that Germany would take advantage of Russia’s loss to Japan in 1905, the British had war-gamed a version of the Schlieffen plan, indicating to them the importance of their involvement on land. At the same time, France made overtures to the UK, with the response being predicated on respect for the neutrality of Belgium – to the extent that a Colonel exceeded his authority and indicated a breach of that neutrality would lead to an “automatic” response. A change of the UK’s government at this time resulted in planning by the two staffs, but on the basis of no commitment by the UK, independent command in the field, and consideration of the use of the British navy (including a possible Inchon-style landing behind enemy lines).

The commanders of the British and French staffs, Wilson and Foch, visited and connected, with Wilson predicting Foch’s ultimate command of the Allied forces.

There was, however, no planning for transport, Wilson’s reaction to which eventually led to a plan based on the British army being the left extension of the French forces (everyone either knew or assumed the Germans would come through Belgium, but their strength was underestimated, and the Belgians clung grimly to their neutrality, refusing to be part of anyone’s planning), after conflicting plans by the navy were scrapped.

Actually, in 1912 the British tried to get Germany to agree to a smaller navy, which they would only consider if the UK agreed to stay out of a war between France and Germany. Everyone told everyone else to, er, go away. French and British army planning continued, and was ready in detail, but in secrecy, by spring, 1914.

There was a certain amount of, if not secrecy, misdirection inside the UK Cabinet. Ms Tuchman brings this out very clearly – far more so than the BBC’s “37 Days” miniseries.

With regard to Russia, the many warnings about that nation’s military shortcomings and inadequacies, including written reports from British observers, were ignored by the UK and France. In addition, attempts at reforming governance, some dating back to the freeing of the serfs in 1861, were mishandled – the decision of Alexander to keep Nicholas II ignorant of statecraft until he reached the age of 30 was an example made even more ludicrous by the early death of Alexander III, and thus the ascension of an ignorant, untrained successor. The outdated faith in the bayonet over the bullet by Minister for War General Sukhomlinov was just more of the same uncomprehending disconnection from the march of time. (Ms Tuchman makes an interesting observation about all armies finding they were short on munitions after war commences. This was actually a factor in the fire on the US navy’s aircraft carrier USS Forrestal in 1967. Other sad parallels around arrogance / overconfidence / underestimating one’s enemy / etc I will address when I review Robert McNamara’s mea culpa “In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam” [the lessons there also include deceit, notably by the South Vietnamese in the early 1960s, and ideological blindness – crucially, just after World War Two).

The second and third sections of this epic deal with the outbreak of war, and the first month of fighting.

This has, perhaps more so since Ms Tuchman’s book was first published, been discussed in considerable depth – and the YouTube channel “The Great War”, reliving the war 100 years later, week by week, with supplemental topical examinations, has been particularly insightful.

However, “The Guns of August” is still a major, respected source on this part of that terrible war, and these two sections illustrate some key points very clearly. One I’ve noticed commented on by many others is the military errors – communication problems, arrogance, and ideological inflexibility, for instance; political ineptness is another, as is the disconnect between war plans and political aims and objectives (another matter in which Clausewitz would not have been happy).

However, what stands out for me is how close the Germans actually came to success on the Western Front. Wellington commented on how close the Battle of Waterloo was (it was “the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life.”). As Ms Tuchman writes:

“So close had the Germans come to victory, so near the French to disaster, so great, in the preceding days, had been the astonished dismay of the world as it watched the relentless advance of the Germans and the retreat of the Allies on Paris, that the battle that turned the tide came to be known as the Miracle of the Marne.”

(I’m also aware of how many times the world almost didn’t go to war then – for instance, if Rasputin hadn’t been in hospital after an assassination attempt, could he have talked the Tsar out of war as he had in 1912? If any one of the farcical sequence of misfortunate events had not happened, Archduke Ferdinand would not have been assassinated, and a pretext could possibly have been avoided for two critical years. One of the books I will eventually review is Richard Ned Lebow’s “Archduke Franz Ferdinand Lives!: A World without World War I”, an alternative history based on World War One not happening, which looks at both the best and the worst of what could have eventuated. My copy is a hard cover, but Amazon have an e-book version here.)

The lessons are summarised at Wikipedia as:

·       too much faith in the power of free trade – I agree with this: free trade can help, the cultural contacts that go with it even more so, but it is not a block against war, nor should it ever be used to excuse or acquiescence in breaches of principle, such as human rights abuses;

·       a ludicrous (my word) belief that war would be quick – Lord Kitchener was noted as being one of the few who insisted on planning for years from the start, but there were a few other visionaries as well;

·       an unbalanced approach to warfare based on offensive and morale – I agree (a mistake the footy team I barrack for also needs to learn to avoid);

·       failure to consider political backlash – which I also agree with; and

·       outdated “wartime etiquette” – which I disagree with, given the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Germany should have recognised that life had changed, and old expectations were outmoded – which also means I support the push for war crimes trials after the war. I’ll come back to “moral” aspects shortly.

One of the other lessons illustrated by this book is the danger of working towards a balance of power – a balance of power can potentially work, as George F. Kennan has advocated in “American Diplomacy”, but, it seems to me that although working towards a balance of power can potentially work in terms of preventing war (although it cannot achieve peace), it is subject to the effect of changes (such as new nations, major changes in technology [gunpowder, artillery, machine guns, railways and better transport, the Dreadnought, planes, nuclear weapons, space, the Internet, etc]) and sometimes, in my opinion, is questionable morally (there was a cost, including actual lives lost, the psychological damage of stress, and the human rights damage of ideological addictions, to the Cold War – which stayed “cold” because of the insanity known as “MAD” – Mutually Assured Destruction).

In the early 1900s, “world opinion” probably was the way that morals were predominantly realised, which was arbitrary (depending on public knowledge [limited by inadequacies of the media and secretiveness of governments] and the vagaries of public perceptions), changeable (due to the aforementioned vagaries), and unclear, as they depended on the values of the culture concerned. However, morals are, since 1948, not arguable or unclear: they have, in my opinion, been made clear by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a series of international treaties – a sequence that goes back to the Hague Conventions mentioned above.

Before World War One, Clausewitz and Schlieffen both raised the issue of making the loser pay the costs of the war – because they lost the war, not for any moral reasons. Clausewitz also tied this to “the winning of public opinion”: “He knew how material success could gain public opinion; he forgot how moral failure could lose it, which too can be a hazard of war.” France cynically planned to avoid violating Belgian neutrality until after Germany had already done so.

None of those are acceptable today – which does not mean they won’t happen, only that, if they do, greater efforts will be made to hide them.

That raises the issue of internal dishonesty and misdirection, in addition to the concerns I’ve read in many locations over secret international agreements, whether they were truly “understandings”, or actual treaties. When I first came across the topic of World War One as a child, the issue of secret treaties was listed as a major cause: I think the problem of dishonest goes further, and I am relieved to be living in a world when commitment to ethics and transparency is becoming fairly widespread in all areas of life.

How we handle whistleblowers is the backlash to this, and one of the tests of our moral commitment.

Finally, the other lessons I wish to comment on is: how can we recognise those who are being insightful? How can we recognise and admit when a cherished ideology is either not working as it should, indifferent, or actually harmful? Lord Kitchener and a few others were going against accepted wisdom, and they were right – as were those advocating for what we now know as the tank. They were not given enough credence, and learning how to ensure that such visionaries are identified (separating them from the deluded is not an easy task, necessarily) is the challenge of learning from hindsight to make it foresight: Ms Tuchman’s book not only shows the lessons made apparent by hindsight, but shows that there were some people who had adequate and appropriate foresight. Not recognising them was, in my opinion, the ultimate problem.

I’ll leave this at that for now, although I may come back and edit it in coming days. I’ve run out of steam for today though, and want to have a very late tea.

PS - the lesson I mentioned earlier in the text should also be highlighted in the summary:
"the desire for respect is as important for nations as people – Germany was young, but wanted to be like the big (empire) kids". 
Also, how to manage personality flaws in leaders is an issue being almost parodied by POTUS45. Trying to set up a meritocracy is not the solution, as the definitions are flawed by the faults of whoever sets it up- as is shown by failed attempts to focus on merit as a "solution" to sexism, and the flaws in my home state's professional engineer registration scheme, which is a perfect illustration of the limits of bureaucratic thinking. 
No, I consider the best solution we have to address personality flaws in leaders is inclusive (meaning protective and inclusive of minorities, and as participatory as possible) democracy, fed accurate and good information through transparency and a good (no tabloid trash, and effective and active counters to fake news) free media supported by first-rate analyses of the type provided by Ms Tuchman and first-rate education, which goes beyond preparing people to be cogs in the business world. 

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[1] This strategy was to have as many major naval ships as the next two navies – see https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Naval_Defence_Act_1889&oldid=899370858, but also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mqX8kCnZu7g and https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/crouching-lion-weary-titan-lessons-world-war-british-grand-strategy/.
The UK’s changed approach to naval supremacy is akin to what the USA is having to consider as China’s naval power grows.

[2] See the Netflix episode “Age of Tanks”, Episode 1, and https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Tank&oldid=916124692#Conceptions