Chernobyl and corporate culture

I am re-watching the HBO  series "Chernobyl", about the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 that killed possibly 27,000 people (the number is disputed and debated - including in scientific circles). The last episode, "Vichnaya Pamyat", blames Soviet culture for the problem - specifically, the state enforced secrecy and, to a lesser extent, the internal culture of striving for corporate success. 

State enforced secrecy also applies in Western nations in relation to military matters - which I consider is fairly widely known (the secrecy is no secret). 

Less widely known until recently is the issue of corporate secrecy. 

Some matters (e.g., internal rates of return) are kept secret for commercial reasons, but there is a mistaken belief that corporate secrecy is "mostly" about hiding problems, such as the knowledge of the possibility of reducing deaths and injuries in car accidents, the effects of burning coal (first raised in the 1800s), or things like the thalidomide scandal, which led to changes in government oversight. It's not: it's mostly about trying to protect commercial competitive advantage (which also has an impact on IP that I don't consider society has properly examined yet).

In recent years, public authorities have been insisting on obtaining more information to counter that - which is excellent in principle, but too much of that is based on management theory that comes out of the 1950s or, in some cases, the 1800s. 

As an example, if a company has, say, half a dozen people who can do a particular type of work, and 3 or 4 projects involving that work, insisting on using the exact same person who was nominated may do the one project a public authority has hired the company to do some good (it may not, too, if the person is being overworked), but will **** the other 2 or 3 public projects. 

There is an insular blindness to some clients that is almost criminally stupid and short-sighted.

Insisting on knowing how much people are being paid is a breach of privacy that results in private industry workers being very disinclined to "go the extra mile" for the IPOCs in public authorities. 

Insisting on managing how many hours are put into specific tasks is 1800s thinking, and the  doing that need to read "Nine Lies About Work: A Freethinking Leader’s Guide to the Real World". - and consider that some of the best outcomes we had in the 1980s were a project where the workers were put on a subcontract for one time critical part of the work, and delivered it ahead of time (for a bonus). If we'd been insisting on hours allocated and nominated rates of pay, that wouldn't have happened. 

However, private industry has it's problems as well, and one I am thinking of is the downplaying of public attitudes when making decisions. 

In my opinion, that is clearest when looking at the Fukushima disaster, where I consider the standards selected for tsunami decision reflected direct costs and failed to consider the impact of a disaster on public opinion (see also here - I wasn't aware until writing this that an admission had been made, but the engineers involved could have argued strongly for greater safety [as obliged by Codes of Ethics] ). My opinion is that the Fukushima disaster has killed the nuclear power industry - it's now just a matter of time. (At least better thinking on risks and implementation of safety lessons are being applied to many still in-use nuclear power stations.)

It may be that private industry would have done better if the regulations required it to, but private companies have the option of not bidding for work. Most look at the chances of winning, the costs of bidding vs. likely return, and how competent the client is (many will make price allowances for the risks involved in dealing with less technically competent clients - which can actually be astronomical).

The other problem we have in the western corporate world, particularly as neoliberalism spread its tentacles in the 80s and 90s, is the drive to climb the corporate ladder of prestige - to prove loyalty to the company (with some aspects being disturbingly similar to the excesses of Japanese business culture), to show one's willingness to put loved ones and one's health last, and so on. Fortunately, the drive for greater health and safety that has been slowly gaining strength since the late 1980s has been offsetting that, and we now have some excellent managers on issues of OHS, work-life balance, and wellbeing. 

The main point I have is: 

although there are aspects of what happened before, during and after Chernobyl that are unique to the USSR, don't be too willing to judge and blame Soviet culture for problems WE also have.

Especially not after decades of neoliberalism and Fukushima.