Threats to democracy

PS - see also https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/15/unacceptable-sudanese-pm-criticises-armys-business-interests

The coup this week in Sudan was a major set-back to the transition to democracy and decency in that "not free" nation. 

There had been hints of a problem with "protests" in support of the military over the last couple of weeks, but I hadn't picked up the seriousness of what was underway - Taiwan, getting our Prime Marketer Scotty from Coal Fondling to COP26, other places I care about, some major family health issues up north and ongoing health issues (including mine) here, etc all took my attention. 

Also, having recently finished a major personal goal, I was taking things a little easy for while.

I'm not sure I would have twigged to what was about to happen if I had been paying attention, and I wonder what various intelligence agencies may or may not have known. Sudan is an oil exporter (but only around one quarter of what it used to be, now that South Sudan is independent), but mostly to China, it seems. 

From the Wikipedia link:

The People's Republic of China is one of Sudan's major trading partners, China owns a 40 percent share in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company. The country also sells Sudan small arms, which have been used in military operations such as the conflicts in Darfur and South Kordofan.

I was going to do one of my "assessment of nation" reports, but there is a key paragraph in the above Wikipedia link:

According to the Corruptions Perception Index, Sudan is one of the most corrupt nations in the world. According to the Global Hunger Index of 2013, Sudan has an GHI indicator value of 27.0 indicating that the nation has an ‘Alarming Hunger Situation’. It is rated the fifth hungriest nation in the world. According to the 2015 Human Development Index (HDI) Sudan ranked the 167^th place in human development, indicating Sudan still has one of the lowest human development rates in the world. In 2014, 45% of the population lives on less than US$3.20 per day, up from 43% in 2009.

The former president who was ousted in 2019 has been charged with war crimes (the nation was subject to UN, EU, Australian, and US  sanctions, [the US sanctions at least were lifted in late 2017 as the nation appeared to start to improve], and these also had an adverse impact on the economy), and allegations of corruption have been made against him. 

Whatever the truth or otherwise of those allegations, the perceptions of Sudan's governance by World Bank respected experts has been poor, except for some improvement after the 2019 change of power - see below.

As with Burma, the military has its fingers in many economic pies - quite apart from the rebel groups in some provinces. The attempted coup last month (which, incidentally, shows the transitional government was aware of what could happen) was attributed to soldiers who were loyal to the previous president . . . was that loyalty economic? Was that the act of people who didn't want to lose their share of wealth, those who were personally loyal for whatever flawed reasons to the previous president, those wanting to be buddies with those around them, or a combination of those and/or other reasons? 

Whatever the cause, they appear to have succeeded - for this time being, at any rate. On the "they", ACLED (who clearly had a very strong idea of what was happening and what could happen) has published a series of three articles pointing the blame finger firmly at "self-interested elites", separate to the military (which raises questions about how well informed / effective the transitional government was), but also states: 

"Dark clouds are on the horizon for Sudan. The coup d’état elevates the role of self-interested elites from the country’s fractious military bloc, and may well set the stage for a showdown between these forces."

The people of Sudan deserve better - and, after decades of abuses, need better.

I personally consider it is in the interest of the rest of the world to ensure they get it, but doubt that will happen. Section VII of the UN Charter provides the right to take action if the UN's  Security  Council (UNSC) determines a risk exists, but China is a permanent member of the UNSC, with a veto on all matters - and China has been possibly starting to follow the  example of Western nations of blocking matters that it doesn't consider in its direct interest. That means if intervening risks the oil China is getting from Sudan (or elsewhere in the region), a veto is likely. Conversely (and we saw hints of this at times with Burma), if inaction is the greater threat to China's oil supplies, some form of action (not necessarily military) may be supported.

At that point it is up to the rest of the world, and I don't know how much attention they would bring to this matter - I suspect, with attention on violent extremism risks in the Sahel, tensions over (democratic) Taiwan, and trying to resuscitate economies after the pandemic, that any intervention may be limited to sanctions. If so, I hope they include very strong, targetted sanctions of the Magnitsky type - and I note the ACLED articles refer to specific individuals, so trust those "in the know" can identify the necessary people to target. 

For your information, the three ACLED articles are, in reverse order of publication: 

• "Appetite for Destruction: The Military Counter-Revolution in Sudan"; 
• "Danse Macabre: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Post-Oil Sudan"; and 
• "Riders on the Storm: Rebels, Soldiers, and Paramilitaries in Sudan’s Margins".
  

The news links I provided in this week's news post are:

Sudan's military have committed a coup . . . - see also here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, - but "the masses" may yet have a say;